Swallowing Mexico without any grease :  The absence of controversy over the feasibility of annexing all Mexico, 1847--1848 by Buttram, Timothy Evans
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Master's Theses and Capstones Student Scholarship
Spring 2008
"Swallowing Mexico without any grease": The
absence of controversy over the feasibility of
annexing all Mexico, 1847--1848
Timothy Evans Buttram
University of New Hampshire, Durham
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For
more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Buttram, Timothy Evans, ""Swallowing Mexico without any grease": The absence of controversy over the feasibility of annexing all
Mexico, 1847--1848" (2008). Master's Theses and Capstones. 71.
https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/71
"SWALLOWING MEXICO WITHOUT ANY GREASE": 
THE ABSENCE OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING ALL 
MEXICO, 1847-1848 
BY 
TIMOTHY EVANS BUTTRAM 
BA, University of New Hampshire, 2002 
THESIS 
Submitted to the University of New Hampshire 
in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the Degree of 




UMI Number: 1454989 
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
® 
UMI 
UMI Microform 1454989 
Copyright 2008 by ProQuest LLC. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest LLC 
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway 
PO Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank Professor Dorsey, Professor Harris, and especially Professor 
Van Zandt for their assistance with this project. I also wish to thank Professors Girard, 
Gullace, and McMahon for their invaluable advice throughout my undergraduate and 
graduate careers here at the University of New Hampshire. Finally, this section would 
not be complete without a hearty thank you to Mom and Dad, whose encouragement (and 
funding!) made this most recent climax of my college career possible. 
n 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii 
LIST OF FIGURES v 
ABSTRACT , vi 
CHAPTER PAGE 
INTRODUCTION 1 
I. THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING MEXICO IN CONGRESSIONAL DIALOGUE 
DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR 10 
President Polk's Message to Congress 14 
Senator Cass' Ten Regiment Bill 24 
The Debate over the Value of Annexation 29 
Conclusion .37 
II. PERCEPTIONS OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS DURING THE OCCUPATION, 1847-1848 40 
American Fortitude 44 
Domination over Mexico 49 
American Superiority 54 
Conclusion 61 
III. AMERICAN SOLDIERS' PERCEPTIONS AND THE OCCUPATION OF 
MEXICO 65 
Logistics 68 
The Mexican Response to Occupation 73 
iii 
American Conduct 79 
Resistance 85 
American Superiority 90 
Disease 94 
Conclusion 97 
IV. CONCLUSION 102 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 104 
IV 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1: Map of Mexican Territorial Losses to the United States 8 
2: 1847 Map of Mexican States 9 
3: List of Battles and Resulting American and Mexican Casualties 64 
4: American Military Operations in Mexico, 1846-1847 100 
5: Route of General Scott's Advance along the Camino Real 101 
v 
ABSTRACT 
"SWALLOWING MEXICO WITHOUT ANY GREASE": 
THE ABSENCE OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING ALL 
MEXICO, 1847-1848 
by 
Timothy Evans Buttram 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2008 
Advisor: Cynthia J. Van Zandt, Associate Professor of History 
This study contributes to the historiography of the "all Mexico" 
movement by showing that America's ability to annex its southern 
neighbor was never a part of the all Mexico debate. The thesis argues 
that common American perceptions of the United States and Mexico 
during the Mexican-American War undermined any grounds on which to 
challenge the achievability of annexation. Chapter I shows that no 
politician, regardless of his stance on the value of absorbing Mexico, 
questioned the feasibility of doing so. Chapter II then demonstrates that 
portrayals of the United States and Mexico in American newspapers 
supported confidence in the American ability to dominate its enemy. 
Finally, chapter III reveals that even American soldiers who came face to 
face with the realities of the occupation held similar perceptions and 
shared the common confidence in American capability. 
vi 
INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after arriving in Tampico in late January 1847, two months 
after the city had fallen into American hands, Captain Robert Anderson 
was told an extraordinary story over dinner. He related it in a letter to his 
wife, "An old Mexican about ninety, when [the American flag] was raised, 
observed to a man standing near him: '...That flag has been my ruin. I 
came from Spain, and I was then young, and was sent into Louisiana; that 
flag came and I then went into Florida; in a few years the same flag 
came, and I then came to this place expecting never to be disturbed by 
it again. But there it is—the same flag, the same people.'"1 
The flag came down when the Mexican-American War ended, but 
many Americans had urged that it should not. In the 1840's Manifest 
Destiny was on the march. Before the conflict, President Polk depicted 
American expansionism as potentially limitless. He set a precedent by 
stating that if war came with Britain over the Oregon territory, American 
efforts could only be compensated by the domination of all of Canada.2 
Similarly, although without President Polk's express approval, the drawn-
out war with Mexico led many to seek more than the initial territorial goals. 
1
 Robert Anderson, An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846-7 (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1911), 21-2. 
2
 "The President's Annual Message," N/7es' National Register vol. 69, no. 1,784 (6 
December 1845). 
1 
By late 1847, citing reasons of philanthropy, pragmatism, and destiny, 
various Congressmen and activists composed a substantial movement to 
annex all of Mexico. 
This so-called "all Mexico" movement is at best treated as a novel 
and unusual episode in the historiography of the Mexican-American War. 
Historians have written little on the issue, favoring broader political and 
military themes and a wide array of social and cultural topics. The few 
who have dedicated articles to the movement have focused on which 
politicians supported or opposed annexation, and why. Edward G. 
Bourne was the first historian to seriously delve into the topic with "The 
Proposed Absorption of Mexico, 1847-48," but his work suffers from dated 
conclusions and a narrow perspective.3 The next major work in the 
historiography is also the most comprehensive. "The Movement for the 
Acquisition of All Mexico," a monograph-length account by Joseph D. P. 
Fuller, traces the political support for and opposition to the movement 
from start to finish.4 Other texts feature discussion of the movement but 
3
 The piece was read at the December 1899 meeting of the American Historical 
Association in response to issues being raised in the Spanish American War. His research 
question asked why the United States did not absorb Mexico after conquering it, and 
was based on the assumption that the United States was naturally inclined toward 
expansion. Edward G. Bourne, "The Proposed Absorption of Mexico, 1847-48," Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association for 1899 vol. 1 (1899): 157-169. 
4
 Fuller's decision to write "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico" was 
prompted by one of his own articles, "The Slavery Question and the Movement to 
Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848." The latter text's thesis refutes Bourne's claim that pro-slavery 
politicians backed the movement when it was at its strongest, and features prominently 
in Fuller's monograph-length piece. John D. P. Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition 
of All Mexico," The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science vol. 
54, no. 1 (1936): 1-176; John D. P. Fuller, "The Slavery Question and the Movement to 
2 
are not exclusively devoted to it.5 The only author who provides a glimpse 
of opinion outside of Washington is John C. Pinheiro, who discusses 
activists as well as politicians when analyzing the functions of anti-
Catholicism in '"Religion without Restriction': Anti-Catholicism, All Mexico, 
and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo."6 
While most historians have treated the movement to annex Mexico 
as a subject of intense political controversy, none besides Pinheiro have 
drawn attention to factors on which all agreed. One such uncontroversial 
factor was the feasibility of annexing Mexico, defining annexation strictly 
as permanent control and administration over Mexico. Interestingly, 
America's ability to accomplish such a monumental task was not a part of 
the debate. 
There is ample reason to challenge America's capacity to annex its 
neighbor in 1848. Although the United States took half of Mexico's territory 
Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review vol. 21, no. 1 (June 
1934): 31-48. 
5
 Frederick Merk notably dedicates several chapters to the subject in his landmark, 
controversial book on Manifest Destiny. He, too, focuses on politicians' reasons for 
support and opposition, in order to prove that the movement's collapse occurred 
because of Manifest Destiny's closer ties to liberal ideology than to expansionism. David 
Pletcher also describes all Mexico in The Diplomacy of Annexation as one of several 
major instances of expansionist sentiment. However neither author treat the movement 
with the degree of depth that John Fuller does. Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and 
Mission in American History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 107-201; 
David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973). 
6
 John Pinheiro focuses particularly on the role of anti-Catholicism in popular support and 
opposition of annexation. He finds that both sides used rhetoric of American superiority. 
John C. Pinheiro, '"Religion without Restriction': Anti-Catholicism, All Mexico, and the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." Journal of the Early Republic vol. 23 (2003): 69-96. 
3 
at the end of the war, it only absorbed a fraction of its population.7 
Taking the entire country would entail establishing control over a vast, 
culturally alien population. Erasing the border might be a simple matter of 
decree, but as a consequence the United States would have been faced 
with a massive imperial responsibility. What obstacles would arise, one 
can only speculate, but they might well have prevented the United States 
from retaining its grip on Mexico. However, during this time of seemingly 
boundless opportunity, Americans did not see the situation that way. 
Contemporary perceptions of the United States and Mexico 
undermined the grounds on which to contest the feasibility of annexation. 
Americans were imbued with a sense of superiority over their southern 
neighbor and a strong conviction of their own country's abilities. Many 
saw Mexico as a corrupt state populated by a poor, apathetic race who 
readily submitted to any authority, and many viewed the United States as 
a superior country whose civilized, spirited people could achieve great 
feats and overcome almost any obstacle. 
The primary purpose of the first chapter is to demonstrate that no 
politician seriously challenged the achievability of annexing Mexico. In 
rough chronological order, it follows the President's and Senators' 
attitudes on how best to resolve the war, at a time when prospects for 
peace were at their most distant. This was during the first session of the 
7
 See Figures 1 & 2 on pages 8 & 9, respectively. 
4 
Thirtieth Congress, the period when the all Mexico movement had the 
most political momentum. The chapter also begins to identify politicians' 
perceptions of Mexico and the United States, which helped make 
annexation seem achievable. 
The second chapter explores the common ways that Mexico and 
the United States were portrayed by near the end of the war. 
Contemporary newspapers were politically partial and often elaborated 
the stances of the parties they supported. They are useful sources for 
fleshing out the perceptions initially identified in the first chapter. The 
articles in these periodicals also contained many common themes which 
both reflected and influenced ideas in American society. They led to the 
conclusions that Mexico was innocuous and that the United States was 
superior. People who accepted these themes had good reason to be 
confident in America's ability to annex Mexico. 
Chapter Three examines the prolific writings of American soldiers 
who lived through the realities of the occupation. Despite often being 
confronted with forceful evidence to the contrary, men on the frontline 
incorporated into their writings many of the same themes that appeared 
in periodicals and political speeches. They applied notions of Mexican 
inferiority and American dominance to depict the occupation as a 
spectacular success, once again giving no reason to question America's 
ability to keep what it had conquered. 
5 
Examining the absence of controversy over America's ability to 
absorb Mexico is significant for several reasons. First, it fills a gap in the 
historiography of the all Mexico movement. Historians like Edward Bourne 
and John Fuller have focused on the reasons behind the movement's 
growth and decline, and on the political motives to support or oppose 
annexation. This thesis delves deeper into the arguments that politicians 
used, highlights one potential controversy that was noticeably missing 
from the debate, and offers an explanation for its absence. 
Second, this thesis follows John Pinheiro's lead in casting a new light 
on the all Mexico movement. The annexation of Mexico was an 
extremely divisive issue in its time, and past historical works accurately 
reflect this. However, on certain facets of the issue, there was an 
undercurrent of consensus. This paper emphasizes one such aspect on 
which politicians agreed, rather than disagreed. It shows that the debate 
was limited to the value and consequences of annexation. 
Third, further exploring the all Mexico movement contributes to a 
better understanding of Manifest Destiny. Today, the term is treated as 
much more than a slogan or identifier of policy.8 Scholars have begun 
unpacking the factors that comprised what is now considered the cultural 
8
 Manifest Destiny was first coined in 1845 by journalist John L. O'Sullivan to describe 
America's mission in North America, but Alfred Weinberg was the first to use the term to 
define a 19th century American ideology. He describes it as a creed popular with many 
Americans, which deftly combined an understanding of American culture and values 
with a sense of high purpose. Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist 
Expansionism in American History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935). 
6 
concept of Manifest Destiny.9 Towards this end, analysis of the all Mexico 
movement is quite relevant. Those who were for annexation expressed 
ideas of expansionism, opportunity, westward momentum, Anglo-
Saxonism, and even philanthropy, all of which were important 
components of Manifest Destiny. 
The perceptions that deterred politicians from earnestly disputing 
the feasibility of annexation also reflected key components of Manifest 
Destiny. Ideas of Mexican inferiority and American superiority 
demonstrated racism, Anglo-Saxonism, and a general confidence in 
American capability. Whether they supported the movement or not, 
Americans conceded the imperturbability of American expansion, as 
encapsulated in the term destiny. The confidence that was intrinsic to the 
ideology of Manifest Destiny left little doubt in the minds of Americans that 
the United States could annex Mexico. 
9
 Frederick Merk challenged Weinberg's thesis in the book Manifest Destiny and Mission in 
American History, which described Manifest Destiny as rooted less in expansionism than in 
new world idealism. He cited philanthropy as a main reason for the ideology's 
popularity. Amy S. Greenberg and Reginald Horsman, respectively, point out that 
rhetoric of masculinity and Anglo-Saxonism also helped construct the concept and 
make it ring true. Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission; Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest 
Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origin of American 
Racial Anglo-Saxons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
7 
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FIGURE 1: 
This map shows the United States expanding at Mexico's expense. The 
dark area is Texas, annexed in 1845 to the Nueces River. In dark stripes is 
land that had been claimed by both Texas and Mexico. This dispute was 
resolved with the signing of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which 
ceded this territory and the land in light stripes to the United States. 
Sir Adolphus William Ward, G.W. Prothero, Sir Stanley Mordaunt Leathes, 
and E.A. Benians eds., The Cambridge Modern History Atlas (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1912), 71. Courtesy of the University of Texas 
Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. 
8 
FIGURE 2: 
Despite sustaining the massive territorial losses depicted in Figure 1, 
Mexico retained the majority of its population within its borders after the 
war. In the absence of exact demographic data, this 1847 map of 
Mexican states roughly demonstrates population density through the size 
of each administrative region. Denser areas required tighter 
administration, while sparser regions could afford to be less centralized. 
The size of Alta California is dramatic in relation to states south of the Rio 
Grande, emphasizing the location of Mexico's population core. As a note 
of interest, this American-made map was used in preparing the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo and appended to the treaty itself. 
J. Disturnell, "Mapa de los Estados Unidos de Mejico," General Records of 
the U.S. Government, RG11. 
9 
CHAPTER I 
THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING MEXICO IN CONGRESSIONAL DIALOGUE 
DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR 
When the 30th Congress assembled in December 1847, the United 
States was facing a dilemma. The Mexican-American War had 
progressed into its second year, but despite spectacular American 
battlefield victories, peace remained elusive. The remnants of the central 
Mexican government seemed to Senator Lewis Cass to evoke a "national 
obstinacy," refusing to yield even when its armies and cities had fallen.10 
With a treaty nowhere in sight, the president and the legislature were 
faced with a decision that not only would affect the way the war would 
be carried on, but might drastically alter the course of the country. 
According to Senator John Calhoun, "I believe the pressing question at 
this moment is, whether we shall conquer Mexico, and hold her as a 
subjected province, or incorporate her into our union."11 
10
 The Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st sess. vol. 17 (Washington D.C.: Blair and Rives, 
1848), 114. Historian Gene Brack makes a compelling argument that Mexicans deeply 
feared the combination of American racism and expansionism. Thus they remained 
reluctant to agree to a treaty surrendering land, even after their country was occupied, 
as it might be the first step down a slippery slope. Gene M. Brack, "Mexican Opinion, 
American Racism, and the War of 1846," The Wesiem Historical Quarterly vol. 1, no. 2 
(April 1970), 167. 
1
' Congressional Globe 53. 
10 
Two years earlier that question was far from most people's thoughts. 
The Mexican-American War had not been intended to be a war of total 
conquest. It had begun over a territorial dispute in southern Texas, and 
although many Americans favored capitalizing on the conflict by seizing 
valuable Mexican provinces, only a handful of ultra-expansionists 
advocated solving the dispute by eliminating the country of Mexico 
altogether.12 Indeed, even limited territorial objectives were subject to 
intense debate in Congress, where Whigs criticized the legitimacy of 
demanding land for a war that they believed was unjust, and the issue of 
whether or not to allow slavery loomed over any potential territorial 
cessions. In Washington, the prospect of absorbing the whole country of 
Mexico was out of the question.13 
Yet as the war drew on, public sentiment for absorbing Mexico 
grew. Washington politicians repeatedly disavowed any intention of 
deliberately pursuing annexation, but the drawn-out occupation of 
12
 "Our true policy is, to go on in strengthening the Union—carrying out the annexation 
policy—to drop all small questions, and boldly grasp the larger one. In fact, to annex the 
whole of Mexico, instead of California—to merge the two republics into one, instead of 
taking a slice for breakfast to-day and another for dinner to-morrow. We shall be 
compelled to do this... as a means of protection of our free and happy institutions." This 
extreme sentiment only appears in The New York Herald before the war. "Foreign 
Interference-Annexation the True Policy of America," The New York Herald, 20 January 
1846,2. 
13
 Politicians only began to seriously consider annexation when several situations 
converged at the end of 1847. Public calls for annexation were becoming louder and 
more difficult to ignore. Also, the debate over slavery in new territory had lost urgency, 
potentially reducing the friction caused by land acquisitions. Most importantly, the latest 
treaty negotiations had failed and peace with Mexico appeared to be nowhere in sight. 
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 104. 
11 
Mexico was looking increasingly like it could be resolved in no other way.14 
Those who supported sustaining the American military presence, including 
the President and many Democratic senators, argued that the occupying 
forces, if properly supplied, could carry on indefinitely and even establish 
a level of jurisdiction over the country. Some senators went further and 
expounded on the benefits of annexing Mexico in case it did occur, 
already convinced that the deed was achievable. Meanwhile, many 
Whigs and several Democrats headed by Senator Calhoun passionately 
opposed eliminating the country of Mexico or pursuing any path that 
would lead to that result. 
Tellingly, though, politicians rarely questioned America's ability to 
accomplish such a mammoth task. Instead, they described Mexico as 
undesirable or innocuous, deeply undermining the notion that Mexicans 
could or would mount any effective resistance. By contrast, the United 
States was depicted as a powerful belligerent that held the fate of 
Mexico in its hands. The ways that the United States and Mexico were 
portrayed in debates over how to further prosecute the war offered no 
serious reason to doubt America's ability to annex Mexico. 
14
 Senator Cass insisted, "There is no man in this nation in favor of the extinction of the 
nationality of Mexico." Congressional Globe 54. Senator Niles believed "it to be the 
general sentiment of this body that the conquest of this extensive country is not desired." 
Congressional Globe 55. Yet Senators Calhoun, Clayton, Pearce, Mangum, Butler, Cass, 
and Clarke, among others, all agreed that annexation was a potential consequence of 
pursuing a policy of occupation, for better or for worse. Congressional Globe 79, 151, 
177, 183, 188,216,244. 
12 
This chapter traces the discussion of annexation's feasibility in 
Washington, defining annexation strictly as interminable domination.15 
The absence of serious challenges to the controversial plan's feasibility 
reveals a notable instance of skewed worldview that was firmly 
entrenched in American politicians' minds. These perceptions reflected 
the confidence that was key to the contemporary cultural concept of 
Manifest Destiny. 
The Thirtieth Congress, before the passage of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, when peace was nowhere in sight, witnessed some 
of the most intense debates over America's prospects in Mexico. The first 
section analyzes the President's views, principally through his December 7 
message to Congress. The remainder of the essay follows, in roughly 
chronological order, the Senate dialogue over the further prosecution of 
the war. War-related debates in the Whig-dominated House of 
Representatives still dwelled on the two-year-old just war issue, revealing 
relatively little about Representatives' perspectives on the feasibility of 
Mexico's annexation.16 Senators, by comparison, give considerably more 
insight in their debates over the Ten-Regiment Bill and Senator Calhoun's 
,5
 Whether or not Mexico could be incorporated into the Union was by contrast a subject 
of great controversy. However, there is no evidence of doubt that the country could be 
dominated. 
16
 For a summary of the significance of the House of Representatives in the all Mexico 
movement, see Bourne, "The Proposed Absorption of Mexico," 169, and Fuller, "The 
Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 99-100. Bourne believes that Whig 
domination of the House was a key reason why Mexican sovereignty was preserved, but 
the record does not support this argument. Fuller notes that the House was unable to 
mount a unified, restraining stance on foreign policy. 
13 
resolution to avoid annexation. Admittedly politicians' words will not 
always match their beliefs, but overall their messages and debates are 
accessible documents that provide some indication of their views.17 
President Polk's Message to Congress 
When the legislature convened in December 1847, President Polk 
issued to Congress an annual message that outlined his stance on the 
direction of policy over the next few months. Despite Mexico's continuing 
refusal to accept the original American terms, Polk urged that territorial 
concessions were the only viable form of indemnity Mexicans could offer 
for a war in which, he insisted, they were the aggressors.18 He had been 
elected on the promise of adding territory to the Union, and he was not 
about to change his stance now that American troops controlled Mexico 
City. However, in this annual address, Polk also felt compelled to clarify 
that his territorial objectives were limited; he had no designs to absorb 
Mexico entirely.19 He made no mention of any pragmatic concerns for 
17
 The legislative debates of the mid-nineteenth century were documented in the 
Congressional Globe, an independently published series sponsored by the government 
and tasked with accurately recording Congressional proceedings. Although 
occasionally the perspective shifts from first person to third person, the debates of the 
Thirtieth Congress were mostly transcribed verbatim. The reporting is detailed enough to 
deliver an accurate account of the debates. 
18
 Senate Executive Document 1, Message from the President of the United States, 30th 
Cong., ls'sess., 1847,8. 
19
 "It has never been contemplated by me, as an object of the war, to make a 
permanent conquest of the republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her separate existence 
as an independent nation." Sen. Exec. Doc 14. Fuller accurately notes that this was the 
first time annexation had been explicitly addressed in Polk's annual messages, indicating 
14 
the consequences of such a bold move, only saying that he had adopted 
the position because the United States "have always desired to be on 
terms of amity and good neighborhood with her [Mexico]."20 
Nonetheless, Polk's resolutions on how the war should be prosecuted in 
the coming months did not render annexation out of the question. 
Though he may have wished to avoid absorbing Mexico, the suggestions 
and opinions expressed in his annual message did not give cause to 
doubt annexation's achievability. 
President Polk promoted two paths toward peace in his address, 
which effectively amounted to the carrot and the stick. One option was 
to use America's control over the country to force reform upon the 
allegedly corrupt Mexican republic. Polk sympathized with "the 
peaceable and well disposed inhabitants of Mexico" who wanted peace 
but feared political reprisal for speaking out.21 Eliminating military tyranny 
and factionalism by establishing and enforcing a stable republican 
government might encourage Mexicans finally to accept a treaty. But if 
after this Mexico still remained obstinate, Polk ominously warned Congress, 
"then we shall have exhausted all honorable means in pursuit of peace, 
and must continue to occupy her country with our troops, taking the full 
the momentum that the all Mexico movement had gained in 1847. Fuller, "The 
Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 98. 
20 Sen. Exec. Doc. 14. 
21
 Sen. Exec. Doc. 15. 
15 
measure of indemnity into our hands, and must enforce the terms which 
our honor demands."22 
The second option, construed above as a last resort, was to coerce 
the Mexican people into accepting a peace by making them more 
acutely experience the stresses of war. Mexican resolve had exasperated 
the President. At the outset of the war, President Polk asserted, it had 
been a point of pride for the United States to make every effort to be 
generous to its opponents. Yet the Mexicans proved "to be wholly 
incapable of appreciating our forbearance and liberality," having 
snubbed American goodwill by launching a large resistance movement 
against the benevolent occupiers.23 Unworthy of special treatment, 
Mexico would be forced to adopt the burden of funding and supplying 
the war effort that it itself had prolonged. The country would remain 
occupied until Mexico accepted a treaty. 
Reforming the allegedly corrupt Mexican government was a noble 
idea, but it is doubtful that President Polk ever intended to pursue this 
course. By the time he had issued his annual message, he had already 
issued orders to military commanders to take measures to procure supplies 
22
 Sen. Exec. Doc. 15. 
23
 President Polk wrote to Congress, "Not appreciating our forbearance, the Mexican 
people generally became hostile to the United States, and availed themselves of every 
opportunity to commit the most savage excesses upon our troops. Large numbers of the 
population took up arms, and, engaging in guerilla warfare, robbed and murdered in the 
most cruel manner individual soldiers, or small parties, who accident or other causes had 
separated from the main body of our army; bands of guerilleros and robbers infested the 
roads, harassed our trains, and, whenever it was in their power, cut off our supplies." Sen. 
Exec. Doc. 17. 
16 
and funds from their surroundings. Also, his administrafion had recalled 
negotiator Nicholas Trist in an attempt to terminate the American peace 
initiative.24 Polk had clearly decided that Mexico should be put under 
greater pressure, but would that translate to a swift conclusion of the war? 
These actions were done with an eye toward forcing the Mexican 
government to accept peace. However, with the Mexican government 
in disarray, no vital areas left to conquer, and, had Trist followed his orders, 
no official agent in Mexico to negotiate a treaty, the prospects for peace 
were increasingly distant. In choosing to pressure Mexico, Polk was well 
aware that the he might be committing the American army to an 
occupation of indefinite length. In preparation, requests for significant 
increases in funds and manpower were included in his message to 
Congress. To keep the war effort financed through July 30, 1849, Polk 
asked for an additional loan of $25,500,000.25 Furthermore, he appealed 
for the authority to recruit not only more volunteers, whose twelve month 
service limits were apparently inadequate, but also an additional force of 
regulars, to be discharged upon the ratification of a peace treaty.26 
24
 Secretary of State Buchanan to Nicholas P. Trist, 6 October 1847, in James Buchanan, 
The Works of James Buchanan vol. 7, ed. John Bassett Moore (New York: Antiquarian 
Press Ltd., 1960), 427. Nicholas Trist was an agent of the President sent to negotiate a 
treaty with Mexico after the Slidell mission had failed. The Mexican government 
vacillated in its cooperation, but after nine months of hard work and disobeying a direct 
executive order to withdraw, Trist was able to secure the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. 
Louis Martin Sears, "Nicholas P. Trist, A Diplomat with Ideals," The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review vol. 11, no. 1 (June 1924), 96. 
25 Sen. Exec. Doc. 24. 
26
 Sen. Exec. Doc. 19. 
17 
President Polk expected the impending occupation to be 
expensive in money and manpower, but his decision was a calculated 
one that he thought was within the American capability to achieve. For 
one, it is apparent that he thought Mexican resistance would not prohibit 
the success of a properly supplied occupation. Although Polk reasonably 
identified the widespread guerilla activity in occupied territory as a 
resistance movement, he cited it as evidence of Mexican uncouthness, 
not as an actual obstacle to American ambitions.27 His willingness to 
alienate the population even further by instituting a system of forced 
indemnity indicated how little Mexican resistance concerned him. 
President Polk also employed rhetoric that reflected a genuine 
belief in American strength and Mexican weakness. Mexican power was 
repeatedly described as "feeble," often in direct contrast to American 
power.28 Americans, meanwhile, were described as "hardy, enterprising 
27
 President Polk's quotation cited in footnote 22 clearly acknowledged that guerilla 
attacks were not acts of generic criminality, but strikes specifically targeting the 
American occupation. However, he emphasized that their hostility was an 
unappreciative and rude reaction to America's generous occupation policy, not a 
threat to the occupation. 
28
 "That it might be manifest not only to Mexico, but to all other nations, that the United 
States were not disposed to take advantage of a feeble power..." 9. "Mexico is too 
feeble a power to govern these provinces..." 9-10. In reference to a hypothetical 
independent California created by local revolutionaries, "Such a government would be 
too feeble long to maintain its separate independent existence..." 10. "Mexico has 
been, and must continue to be too feeble to restrain them [savages] from committing 
depredations, robberies and murders, not only upon the inhabitants of New Mexico itself, 
but upon those of the other northern States of Mexico. It would be a blessing to all these 
northern States to have their citizens protected against them by the power of the United 
States." Sen. Exec. Doc. 11. 
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and intelligent."29 One passage exuded praise tor the valorous 
accomplishments of American arms, exclaiming, "Every patriot's heart 
must exult, and a just national pride animate every bosom, in beholding 
the high proofs of courage, consummate military skill, steady discipline, 
and humanity to the vanquished enemy, exhibited by our gallant 
army..."30 Some of the language that the President used was surely 
exaggerated, but overall his message reveals a glimpse of Polk's 
understanding of the situation, where Mexico was at the mercy of the 
United States. 
The information that Polk was being fed by advisors and generals 
reinforced this optimistic appraisal of the situation. General Scott had 
already developed and conveyed a plan for a prolonged occupation of 
Mexico, complete with specific details on the support needed to achieve 
it.31 In addition to consolidating American dominance over the country 
by continuing to control key strategic points, Scott also committed 
Mexican assets to pay a portion of the costs that would inevitably 
29
 Sen. Exec. Doc. 10. 
30
 Sen. Exec. Doc. 5. 
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 In a letter written after the capture of Mexico City cited by Senator Cass, General Scott 
wrote, "Augment this army to fifty thousand men to enable them to occupy, at the same 
time, nearly all the State capitals and other principal cities; to drive guerilla and other 
robbing parties from the great highways of trade; to seize into our hands all the ordinary 
revenues of the country, internal as well as external, for the support of the occupation, 
and to keep the central Government in constant motion and alarm, until constrained to 
sue for peace." Congressional Globe 150. In a separate letter to Secretary of War 
Marcy, Scott wrote, "Annexation and military occupation would be, if we maintain the 
annexation, one and the same thing, as to the amount of force to be employed by us." 
General Scott to Secretary of War Marcy, 25 December 1847, quoted in Scott 560-561. 
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accumulate over the indefinite duration of the occupation.32 As the 
President had requested, the promised twelve to fifteen million dollars 
would reduce the amount of money paid from the American treasury, 
which from 1846 to 1848 had amounted to $58 million.33 Scott's 
confidence in his provisional solution seemed to demonstrate, on paper, 
that Mexico was susceptible to American control and even some degree 
of administration. 
Meanwhile, several other generals strongly urged that Polk do away 
with unnecessary pretenses and annex Mexico outright.34 General 
Quitman submitted an impassioned essay trumpeting the reasons why 
Mexico should be stripped of its independence. Annexation was 
achievable because, "It [Mexico] is already prostrated... With ten 
thousand men, we can hold this capital and Vera Cruz, and keep open a 
safe communication between the two points. Possessing the heart, there 
32
 "The war being virtually over, I now gave attention to a system of finance for the 
support of the army and to stimulate overtures of peace. The subject required extensive 
inquiries and careful elaboration. My intention was to raise the first year about twelve 
millions of dollars, with the least possible pressure on the industry and wealth of the 
country, with an. increase to fifteen millions in subsequent years. The plan is given at 
large, in seven papers (four reports and three orders). See Ex. Doc. No. 60, H. of R., 30th 
Congress, 1st Session, p. 1046, and following. The orders are here omitted and the 
finance details, contained in the four reports, also." Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut-
General Scott LL.D. vol. 2 (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864), 553. 
33
 K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War 1846-1848 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974), 
397. 
34
 Several politicians commented on the prevalence of annexation sentiment among 
military leaders. Senator Niles remarked, "No one can mistake that it is the sentiment of 
the army... that this war is only to end with the conquest of Mexico." Congressional 
Globe 55. James Gadsden wrote, "I have not yet seen the officer that is not for 
conquest." James Gadsden to Senator Calhoun, 28 December 1847, in John C. 
Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun vol. 25, ed . Clyde N. Wilson & Shirley Bright Cook 
(Charleston, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 46. 
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could be no sufficient force concentrated to annoy us."35 General Worth 
was equally sure that annexation was both desirable and possible, albeit 
unconcerned about the details. As he frankly admitted to Secretary of 
War Marcy, "After much reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that it 
is our decided policy to hold the whole of Mexico—The details of the 
occupation are comparatively unimportant—I mean by occupation, 
permanent conquest and future annexation..."36 While the President may 
or may not have been receptive to their clamor, their case could only 
reinforce Polk's contention that the state of things in Mexico was 
conducive to a successful, lengthy occupation.37 
The external threat to the war effort that, from the outset, 
Americans were most apt to take seriously did not come from Mexico, but 
from across the Atlantic. Great Britain, with her powerful military and 
broad international interests, was, unlike Mexico, perceived to be a 
country to be reckoned with. Although President Polk had spoken 
confidently about the prospects of victory in an Anglo-American conflict, 
most Americans wanted to avoid war with Britain, particularly while 
35
 Letter from Major General Quitman, 15 October 1847, General Scott and His Staff 
(Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot & Co., 1848), 103. 
36
 General Worth to Secretary of War Marcy, 30 October 1847, Marcy MSS, quoted in 
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 94. 
37
 Although President Polk was well-known for territorial ambitions, the only official position 
he ever adopted toward annexation was its explicit rejection. No evidence suggests 
that he ever actually wanted to take all of Mexico. However, had peace been delayed 
any longer, Polk may well have added all land to the Sierra Madre to his demands. 
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 126. 
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locked in battle with Mexico.38 British intervention in the Mexican War had 
been a genuine, though distant, concern earlier in the war.39 But by mid-
1847, George Bancroft, who had been sent on a mission to England by 
Secretary of State Buchanan, relayed to the administration that British 
statesmen were resigned to American dominance over Mexico, and that 
they regarded drastic extensions of American boundaries an "inevitable 
necessity."40 British sentiment, according to Bancroft, was embodied by 
Lord Palmerston's comment, "They are going to take two-thirds of Mexico. 
They might as well take the whole."41 This suggested that the United 
States would be free to choose how to conclude its war with Mexico. 
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether or not President 
Polk thought the annexation of Mexico was possible, since he never 
addressed that aspect of the issue directly. He believed Mexicans had 
the right and perhaps, with American help, the capability to govern 
themselves, and ended the discussion at that. 
38
 President Polk predicted victory in a war over Oregon and Canada as late as 
December 1845. "The President's Annual Message," N/7es' National Register vol. 69, no. 
1,784 (6 December 1845). However, most Americans welcomed the June 1846 Oregon 
settlement because it removed the grounds for conflict with Great Britain. Pletcher, The 
Diplomacy of Annexation, 414. 
39
 General Taylor gave a sober appraisal of Britain and the Mexican War, writing, "I 
apprehend no outbreak with England, be her cause of grievances what they may; she 
cannot do without our trade; although our people might be ready to rush into war with 
her; since our unprecedented success in Mexico; but should we have to measure 
strength with John Bull, we will find some difference between him & the Mexicans." 
Zachary Taylor, Letters of Zachary Taylor from the Battle-Fields of the Mexican War ed. 
William K. Bixby (Rochester, NY: The Genesee Press, 1908), 131. 
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However, President Polk's annual address did reveal he was 
optimistic that indefinite occupation was a practicable policy course. 
Garrisoning the country for an indeterminate period of time shared many 
traits with annexation. The absorption of Mexico may well have even 
been the culmination of that policy. Polk's conviction of the feasibility of 
indefinite occupation could only strengthen his confidence that Mexico 
could be annexed. For example, his contention that order could be 
maintained despite a widespread guerilla movement and an indemnity 
policy that would further estrange the Mexican population, combined 
with the rhetoric he used to describe the two countries, supported the 
idea that these obstacles could be overcome in an all Mexico context. 
Some asserted that the policies of occupation and annexation amounted 
to the same thing, as Senator John M. Clayton asked, "Pray, sir, what do 
you call keeping the Central Government in motion, occupying the State 
capitals, and seizing the revenues of Mexico? I call it subjugation of the 
country and an annihilation of the Government of Mexico."42 Even if his 
message did not explicitly comment on the achievability of taking all 
Mexico, it certainly did not give cause for doubt that Mexico could be 
dominated. 
42
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Senator Cass' Ten-Regiment Bill 
President Polk's message to Congress stated plainly the forceful 
mode in which he wished to prosecute the war, but the decision was not 
entirely the President's to make. It was up to Congress to provide the 
President with the resources and manpower with which to conduct his 
policy of choice. Polk's supporters faced opposition from both members 
of the rival Whig party and dissenting Democrats, so many senators were 
not about to allow the President's plan go unchallenged.43 Senator John 
Berrien demonstrated the attitude of many of his peers when he asserted 
legislative authority, saying, "We should determine for ourselves—not at 
the bidding of the President, but for ourselves, as the constitutional 
depository of the war-making power—what are the objects to be 
accomplished."44 For two long months legislators would debate over the 
future course of the war, including the viability of the controversial all 
Mexico movement. 
As soon as the 30th Congress assembled. Senators were anxious to 
begin passing legislation influencing the policy of the war. On December 
15, 1847, two Democrats submitted resolutions pertaining to the future 
prosecution of the war. Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina called 
43
 The composition of the 30th congress was thirty-eight Democrats, twenty-one Whigs, 
and one Independent, and the majority party suffered from considerable disunity. 
44
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for an official statement of intent to avoid annexing Mexico.45 Shortly 
thereafter, Senator Daniel Dickenson of New York countered with a 
request that the United States annex as much territory as would be 
deemed expedient.46 In addition to these resolutions. Senator Lewis Cass 
of Michigan had introduced a bill calling for the increase in the army 
sought by President Polk. He, too, expected its prompt consideration. 
Naturally, a day was spent deciding whose contribution had priority as 
each argued that his was the most vital. Senator Cass' Ten Regiment Bill 
eventually won precedence, but its succinct consideration was not to be. 
The necessity of an army increase, its potential implications for the fate of 
Mexico, and the justice of the war itself all became fair game in the 
Senate deliberation over Senator Cass' bill. The debate became a catch-
all for all issues surrounding the continued prosecution of the war, and did 
not conclude before the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo rendered each 
man's proposed legislation essentially moot. 
Before Senator Cass had much of an opportunity to defend his bill, 
it came under attack. Cass' contention that the army urgently needed to 
be augmented was a prime target for criticism. Senator John Berrien of 
Georgia, a Whig, dismissed the need for more troops, saying, "It is evident 
45
 "Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be 
adopted which may lead to consequences so disastrous [the incorporation of Mexico 
into the Union]." Congressional Globe 26. 
46
 "Resolved, That true policy requires the Government of the United States to strengthen 
its political and commercial relations upon this continent, by the annexation of such 
contiguous territory as may conduce to that end, and can be justly obtained..." 
Congressional Globe 27. 
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that the army in Mexico was perfectly safe—flushed with victory, and 
confident in its strength... while the army of the enemy is scattered, 
dispersed, and Mexico is without an efficient government, and destitute of 
resources and men to resist our arms."47 In the same vein, Senator John 
Crittenden of Kentucky, also a Whig, asked, "If Mexico now lies prostrate 
before you, without an army or government; with here and there only a 
body of guerillas, instead of an army to oppose you, what, in the name of 
Heaven, if this is all that is left of her, do you want with ten thousand more 
troops?"48 According to their argument, the only realistic threat to the 
United States could be found on a battlefield. Being far too weak to 
organize and field another army, Mexico "was now nothing but a huge 
undigested mass of vanity and faction."49 The country was defanged in 
their view and entirely at America's mercy. Save for the trifling "few 
skirmishes here and there with parties of guerrillas," the road in front of the 
occupation forces was clear.50 
Democratic supporters of the bill disputed this line of reasoning, 
emphasizing the difference between a war and an occupation. Senator 
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi conceded that, even at its current size, the 
American army could march through South America and defeat every 
army it encountered, but routing conventional forces was no longer the 
47
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task at hand. Although Mexico had been defeated militarily, he ventured 
that "we have not even suppressed the hostility of the Mexican people... 
Mexico is not conquered."51 Senator William Allen of Ohio lent even more 
urgency to the situation, listing the tremendous obstacles facing American 
forces: 
Well, sir, under these circumstances, with that army cut, hacked, 
and bleeding in the achievement of its glorious victories, shall we 
leave them there, to occupy a country as large as our own, 
surrounded by ten millions of enemies, and subjected to all the 
perils to which their precarious situation exposes them, without 
taking the precaution to sustain them by additional 
reinforcements?52 
Senator Allen's appraisal of the situation certainly suggested that 
the occupation force was in dire straits, but the gravity of these obstacles 
was tempered by the notion that they could be overcome. The United 
States, according to Senator Cass, had proven itself to be among "the 
mightiest nations of the world."53 With enough soldiers, the American 
army could not only endure these burdens, but even reduce the 
likelihood of resistance. Cass believed that a large force would intimidate 
the population into submission, and perhaps, as the merits of American 
administration sank in over time, reconcile them to the United States.54 
51
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 "It is much better to render opposition hopeless, by the display of strength, than to 
excite it into action, by the display of weakness." Congressional Globe 88. "With few 
sympathies to unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, and govern them with 
energy and justice, such as are new in their history... till the experience of our sway and 
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Thus, although Democratic supporters of President Polk's policy admitted 
that the troubles that the occupation army faced were serious, they also 
perceived that those difficulties were surmountable in both the short and 
long terms.55 
Other Whigs opposed the bill from an entirely different angle. 
According to Senator John Hale of New Hampshire, Senator John Clayton 
of Delaware, and Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, voting to 
enlarge the army would be wrong because the whole war was unjust. 
Senator Johnson offered a description of the regretable situation. "She 
surrenders. Yet still our vengeance is not glutted. Innocent, unoffending, 
outraged Mexico has yet more cities to be laid to waste or conquered... 
[by] the mighty and crushing power of our arms."56 The legitimacy of the 
war was frequently contested by Whig Congressmen in the House of 
Representatives, as well.57 Congressman John Van Dyke of New Jersey 
argued that the pursuit of the war and indemnity, with "our conquering 
sword gleaming above her, is unreasonable and unfair towards Mexico... 
its operation around them shall have brought them to a better state of feeling." 
Congressional Globe 89. 
55
 Senator Crittenden, meanwhile, insisted that Senator Cass in fact "did not apprehend 
any danger" from the threats that he treated so seriously, instead desiring the army 
increase for "any possible contingency." Even if Crittenden was correct and the 
Democrats' argument was not genuine, the prospects for the success of the occupation 
still seemed good. Congressional Globe 113. 
56
 Congressional Globe 140. Senator Hale agreed that, "The country is engaged in a war 
which is unjustifiable; we confess it is wrong to go on." Congressional Globe 122. Senator 
Clayton equated conquest to robbery. Congressional Globe 151. 
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 On one day alone, four Whig Congressmen issued resolutions calling for wartime 
restraint on these grounds. See the resolutions of Congressmen Bott, Thompson, Toombs, 
and Van Dyke. Congressional Globe 61-62. 
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and unmagnanimous and unchristian in us."58 Innocent, weak Mexico 
was at the mercy of American arms, so it was up to politicians to direct 
the United States along a path that was more becoming of an honorable, 
Christian nation. 
No matter their attitude toward the Ten-Regiment Bill, politicians 
portrayed a scenario where the prospects of a successful occupation 
were good. If the extra regiments were deemed unnecessary, it was 
because American power had already eliminated any relevant Mexican 
resistance. If reinforcements were needed, it was to ensure that Mexican 
resistance would be overcome. Finally, if the continued prosecution of 
the war was unjust, it was because Mexico was an innocent victim. 
Images of Mexican innocence were accompanied by images of 
defenselessness in the face of American power. Each line of reasoning 
featured the persistent theme of Mexican weakness and American 
strength. In the context of annexation, it would be difficult to argue, by 
these politicians' estimates, that Mexico could offer effective resistance to 
American domination. 
The Debate over the Value of Annexation 
The direction of the Ten-Regiment Bill debate changed 
considerably on January 11 when Senator John Clayton expanded on the 
58
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Whigs' unjust war thesis by venturing that increasing the army and 
following the President's occupation plan would lead to an equally unjust 
annexation of Mexico.59 Although Senator Calhoun had implied this same 
point in a verbal explanation of his resolution one week earlier, only now 
did it begin to gain momentum. Quickly the debate transformed into a 
discussion of the value of absorbing Mexico, which some claimed to have 
merit and others argued to be "among the greatest calamities that could 
happen."60 In their arguments, however, neither group seriously 
challenged the American capability to realize the annexation. Indeed, 
many Senators had concrete concepts of an American-dominated 
Mexico, which they fully expected would be realized once the decision 
was made to annex Mexico. 
Senator Calhoun had fired the first shot in this conflict well before it 
had fully developed. He had predicted that the war would not quickly 
resolve, and feared that the President's plan of "conquering peace" 
would inevitably "have blotted her [Mexico] out of the list of nations," in 
the same way that England stumbled into control of India.61 Aware that 
any conclusion to the war, no matter how drastic, might increase in 
appeal as the stalemate dragged on, Calhoun tailored his resolution to 
deny the option of annexation. 
59
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On January 4 Calhoun received the opportunity to give his 
reasoning and presented his argument point by point. First, annexation 
was inconsistent with the object of the war. The United States needed to 
disprove international suspicions of American ambition and belligerence, 
and reemphasize America's traditional reputation for "wisdom, 
moderation, discretion, justice, and other high qualities."62 
Second, there was no precedent of forcing a people into the 
Union.63 Nor was there a reason to start now, because, as his third point, 
"we have never dreamt of incorporating into our Union any but the 
Caucasian race—the free white race." To place the "Indians and mixed 
race of Mexico" on equality with Anglo-Saxons would be "fatal to our 
institutions."64 
Senator Calhoun's fourth and fifth points elaborated on the theme 
that annexation was inconsistent with American traditions. Conquest was 
not in keeping with republican ideals, and would be subversive to those 
ideals by establishing empire. His sixth, final point was that Mexico could 
never be fully incorporated into the United States, since forcing 
annexation would require a constant military presence. "Never will the 
time come," Calhoun warned, "that these Mexicans will be heartily 
reconciled to your authority... Of all nations on the earth they are the 
62
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most pertinacious... [and] hold out longest, and often even with the least 
prospect of effecting their object." Even if the population was somehow 
acquiescent, he reemphasized that it was a mistake to absorb those 
"ignorant and unfit for liberty, unpure races." All precautions had to be 
taken to avoid the "great and fatal mistake" of annexing Mexico.65 
Although Senator Calhoun provided an exhaustive list of concerns, 
it is evident that the American ability to control and administer a 
conquered Mexico was not chief among of them. When making his 
argument, Calhoun had governmental templates in mind. He expected 
the American administration to be in sufficient control to first implement 
territorial government, and then to try to fully incorporate Mexico into the 
United States.66 Although Calhoun did not think that the Mexican estados 
would ever truly integrate into the predominantly Anglo-Saxon states of 
the Union, he did predict the territory would resemble a colony, held by 
force, along the lines of British India or Ireland.67 His fundamental 
argument was that having such a colony would be detrimental to the 
United States. Ultimately, though Calhoun thought the annexation of 
65
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Mexico would be an expensive, heavy burden, his worry that it could in 
fact be achieved was a primary motivation for submitting the resolution. 
With Senator Clayton's warning about the imminent eventuality of 
absorbing Mexico, other Senators joined Calhoun in proclaiming the 
pitfalls of annexation. Senator Andrew Butler, the other Democratic 
Senator of South Carolina, seconded many of his colleague's reservations. 
Conquering Mexico was costly, and invited tyranny in the United States.68 
Meanwhile, Senator James Pearce of Maryland, a Whig, predicted 
particularly dire consequences. Not only would Mexico be to the United 
States what Ireland was to Great Britain, but it would also exacerbate 
domestic friction, presumably over slavery, beyond the point of no 
return.69 Nonetheless, both Senators gave confident appraisals of the 
progress of the occupation by emphasizing America's unmitigated 
domination over Mexico.70 Despite the disasters that would befall the 
68
 Annexation would require extended occupation, since "such a government could not 
stand without the perpetual guarantee of a standing army." American institutions were 
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United States as a result, annexing Mexico seemed like an attainable, 
albeit highly undesirable, objective. 
Fuller argues that public support for all Mexico had become much 
more conspicuous by this time, leading some Democrat Senators to subtly 
revise their earlier positions.71 Several now cautiously tested the waters, 
careful to present only a "hypothetical view of the compensating 
advantages likely to arise from the annexation of Mexico," not advocate 
the deed itself.72 Among other economic and strategic gains, a 
prolonged occupation would pave the way for the "political and social 
regeneration" of the Mexican people, "uniting her to us" under "civilizing 
and Americanizing influence."73 Senator John Dix of New York described 
the beneficial role that the occupation force would play: 
As hostilities are now suspended, the chief province of the army 
will be to maintain internal tranquility, support the civil authorities 
in the execution of the laws, to free the country from the robber 
and guerrilla bands by which it is infested, and subserve the great 
purposes of government by affording security to liberty, property, 
and life-a security the Mexicans have not fully enjoyed. The very 
exercise of these beneficent agencies will tend to disarm the 
hostility towards us with the thinking portion of the population.74 
Mexico, and trample upon her least able to resist us." Both passages offer a dim view of 
Mexico's ability to resist subjugation. Congressional Globe 186, 175. 
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As for the rest of the population, Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi allayed 
any concerns.75 He concurred that annexation was not only achievable 
but beneficial, outlining the specific steps the occupation army would 
take to successfully absorb Mexico into the United States as a stable and 
prosperous territory.76 With rich resources and a mostly docile, if not 
outright welcoming, population, annexation could not seem more 
practicable! 
Expansionist Senators clearly had administrative templates of a 
dominated Mexico in mind. At first glance, it might seem as if they 
advocated a policy of incorporating Mexico into the Union. The 
redemption of backward Mexico was a prominent theme in their 
speeches, but it was not necessarily a genuine goal. Philanthropy was a 
convenient and noble justification for annexation, which, according to 
historian Frederick Merk, rang true with Americans' understanding of 
Manifest Destiny.77 However, judging from the potential economic and 
strategic benefits that they cited, the Senators had no intention of lifting 
Mexicans into equality with Americans. In listing these benefits, Senator 
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Foote ignored the Mexican people altogether, depicting Mexico as rich, 
virgin land perfect for American settlers and entrepreneurs.78 Senator Dix 
echoed his colleague's vision, confidently asserting, "Settlements will be 
formed within the unoccupied and sparsely-peopled territory of 
Mexico."79 Such language invoked images of the American West, but 
here it was being applied to the land south of the Rio Grande.80 
Indeed, the idea of taking advantage of Mexican land under 
American supervision sounded suspiciously like the administration of Indian 
territory, under which Native Americans were displaced and their land 
exploited by prospectors. That was a plan with which expansionists would 
have been very familiar. The strategy was not very old, and the man 
largely behind it, Senator Lewis Cass, still pursued an active political 
career.81 Once the decision was made to annex Mexico, expansionist 
Senators expected that the country would be absorbed neither as a 
78
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colony nor as an integral part of the Union, but as virgin land along the 
lines of freshly conquered Indian territory. 
Senator Pearce, whose warning about overextension could be 
interpreted as a concern that Mexico could not be held once taken, 
came closest to outright challenging the American capacity for success. 
However, his statement was more likely aimed at forecasting the split of 
the North and South over domestic friction generated by slavery. No 
politician explicitly challenged America's ability to control and administer 
Mexico. Many implied that retaining a hold on the country would 
generate immense costs and frustration, but emphasized the burden that 
the United States would be shouldering rather than strictly challenge the 
American capacity to pull it off. Indeed, this emphasis suggests that it was 
their fear that Mexico's could be permanently dominated that led so 
many Senators to passionately oppose any such action. 
Conclusion 
How the United States should proceed in its war against Mexico was 
a divisive question that urgently needed to be answered in early 1848. 
The President and some Senators made it clear that they wanted to 
prosecute the war with redoubled effort, allegedly to pressure Mexicans 
into seeking peace. Other Senators vehemently opposed this course, 
claiming it to be unnecessary or unjust. All the while, the all Mexico 
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movement was gaining momentum, leading several Senators to address 
the prospects of annexation directly. Yet throughout all the political 
debate, no voice suggested that Mexico could not be held interminably. 
President Polk explicitly stated that he did not seek annexation, but 
points in his address cast no doubt that it was possible. Pursuing a course 
of indefinite occupation indicated that he believed Mexico could be 
subjugated for a long time. Seeking to increase the pressure on a 
population already showing signs of resistance was an especially bold 
move, demonstrating his confidence in America's capacity to dominate 
the Mexican populace. Particularly if he accepted the optimistic 
appraisals of his advisors. President Polk may well have considered 
annexation to be feasible. 
Congress echoed the President's confidence in American 
capability. Democratic Senators who supported Polk's plan admitted that 
the current garrison force might be insufficient to keep a grip on Mexico, 
but they were certain that several more regiments could accomplish the 
task. Those who believed that additional troops were unnecessary felt 
that Mexican resistance was no threat. And Whig Senators who felt that 
the war was unjust shamed their colleagues for letting defenseless Mexico 
be laid prostrate by aggressive American arms. Each argument 
emphasized America's ability to dominate Mexico. 
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When Congress discussed annexation directly, the debate 
centered on the value of such a peace, not on whether or not it could be 
achieved. Senators Dix and Foote clearly had no doubts that if the United 
States decided to annex Mexico, the country would submit to American 
administration and become a beneficial addition to United States 
territory. Other Senators offered less sanguine appraisals of Mexico's 
worth. Opponents of annexation often based their arguments on 
impressions of Mexican racial inferiority, predicting that Mexico would be 
a burden and undermine American institutions. They accepted that the 
United States could dominate Mexico permanently, but insisted that 
achieving that goal would be detrimental for the Union and its ideals. 
No matter the stance that American politicians adopted toward 
the way the war should be prosecuted, Mexico's fate appeared to be 
entirely in American hands. Each position featured language that implied 
American strength, Mexican weakness, or both. Because of these 
perceptions, American politicians held no reservations that the 
annexation of Mexico was achievable. This explains why the discussion of 
feasibility was absent from the debate. 
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CHAPTER II 
PERCEPTIONS OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS DURING THE OCCUPATION, 1847-1848 
Despite having overcome Mexico's army and occupied its 
prominent cities, in January of 1848 the United States remained at war 
with a country seemingly unwilling to admit defeat. A few months earlier, 
American politicians had disputed whether or not territorial demands 
were appropriate peace terms, but as the war dragged on many 
Americans began to contemplate more drastic measures. Politicians now 
debated whether or not it was pragmatic to annex all Mexico. The New 
York Herald, a Democratic-leaning publication, declared, 
The longer duration of Mexico's nationality... is in the scale. If she 
submits to terms of peace acceptable to the United States, before 
the period of our Presidential election, she may yet remain a 
separate and independent nation-if she does not, her fate is sealed 
forever, and the stars and strips [sic] will, of right, legally and 
equitably take the place of the eagle and the snake. In nine 
months, at most, Mexico will be Mexico still, or part of the United 
States.82 
Contemporary critics might challenge the author's assertion that 
absorbing Mexico would be legal and equitable, but it was clear that the 
longer the war lasted, the more momentum the all Mexico movement 
gained. There was a sense that if the American policy of occupation 
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 "The Present - The Future - Mexico," The New York Herald, 26 January 1848, 2. 
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persisted, the United States would inevitably and unavoidably annex 
Mexico. While Congress debated the expediency of the consequences 
of staying the course, the idea that the United States did not have the 
capability to annex Mexico remained conspicuously absent from the 
dialogue. Indeed, the urgency with which some Senators contested 
Senator Cass' Ten Regiment Bill and President Polk's plan "to prosecute it 
[the war] with increased energy and power," stemmed from worries that 
America absolutely could annex Mexico, and that the integrity of 
American institutions would subsequently suffer.83 
American politicians did not challenge their country's ability to 
annex Mexico because their understandings of America and Mexico 
undermined the grounds on which to do so. Each faction's arguments 
relied upon Mexican and American stereotypes that had become 
entrenched among Americans over the course of the Mexican-American 
War. Expansionists saw opportunities to be had in a rich land ripe for the 
taking. Calhoun Democrats feared the consequences of incorporating 
the large, "mixed race" of Mexico into the union.84 Whigs portrayed 
Mexicans as the helpless victims of American bullying. Debates in 
Washington D.C. offered glimpses of how politicians perceived Mexico 
and the United States. However, other sources offer a more complete 
perspective. 
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Many contemporary newspapers were unabashedly partisan.85 
Their contents frequently indicated and elaborated on the political 
positions ot the party that their editors supported. Not shy to display their 
political affiliations, authors made no claim to be objective. Yet they did 
claim to be reporting facts.86 As sources that strove to be authoritative, 
periodicals both influenced and reflected common cultural perceptions 
of the United States and Mexico. A portrait of Mexicans and Americans 
emerged, which often transcended party lines and gave no reason to 
doubt the ability of the United States to annex Mexico. Mexicans were 
innocuous, uncivilized, and inferior, and thus posed little threat to 
American plans. Americans, by contrast, were powerful, enlightened, 
and superior, and thus capable of monumental deeds. 
This chapter provides a close reading of contemporary newspapers 
because of their close connections to politics and their reflection of 
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common perceptions. Most articles were written between the fall of 
Mexico City in September 1847, and the signing of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo in February 1848. They came from twelve major 
newspapers from the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, West, and South.87 
However, the articles cited from this sample may also have reached 
beyond these newspapers' readership, as they were often printed in 
multiple publications.88 
The amount of material cited from each source depended largely 
on the topics each focused on. The New York Herald, for example, was a 
widely read newspaper that tightly embraced the ideology Manifest 
Destiny. Its authors called for unrestrained expansion and frequently 
juxtaposed the United States and Mexico, describing each country's 
characteristics and values to better demonstrate the importance of the 
war and the conquests that would follow. As periodicals go, it provided 
an unprecedented amount of relevant material. 
Whig newspapers, by comparison, were less dedicated to providing 
details on the relationship between Mexico and the United States. 
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 For example, pieces that originated from The Boston Whig, The National Intelligencer, 
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Occasionally an author would reveal some indication ot his perspective 
when directly challenging a Democratic argument. However, the 
majority of articles concerning the conflict focused on the morality of the 
war. More pragmatic issues were not in doubt, but neither were they 
Whigs' main concerns. As a result, the material cited from these sources is 
more limited. 
American Fortitude 
In The New York Herald, a Democratic author exclaimed, "What a 
great people we are!"89 This statement, which could be interpreted 
several ways, perhaps best summed up the general understanding that 
Americans had of the United States. Democrats principally used the word 
great to imply integrity and nobility. They proudly emphasized American 
glory, spirit, and values. Whigs also acknowledged American gallantry, 
but were less apt to glorify the deeds of a belligerent nation. Whig 
sources generally treated great as meaning powerful, acknowledging the 
military success of the United States. Both interpretations implied that 
American strength did not falter in the face of adversity. 
This same theme of American fortitude could be identified in 
political speeches when wartime success was being described. Politicians 
89
 The author made this statement because he was very impressed by America's 
program to improve Mexican infrastructure during the occupation, specifically the plan 
to build a railroad from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. "American and Mexican Affairs: Life in 
Mexico," The New York Herald, 10 January 1848, 1. 
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of both parties accepted the use of the rhetoric of military gallantry to 
describe American victories on the battlefield.90 Similarly, authors of many 
newspaper articles often employed the same language. Words like 
gallant courage, and heroic showed up frequently, particularly in 
Democratic-leaning publications.91 
In a time when there was a great deal of pressure to be patriotic, 
this language was certainly in part a calculated, overt expression of 
national pride. However, that did not necessarily mean it was considered 
to be empty rhetoric. The combats of 1846 and 1847 supported the 
notion that American strength derived from something more than just 
conventional military power. Were numbers alone the deciding factors, 
the American army would have been foiled at every turn. Senator Cass 
claimed that one of the "proudest trophies" of the war was a table 
prepared by the Adjutant General's Office describing an uninterrupted 
"series of successes" from 1846 through 1847. The details show that out of 
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twenty-eight battles, Americans were outnumbered in all but one: the 
siege of Vera Cruz. During the average engagement there were three 
Mexican soldados for every American soldier, yet Mexican forces suffered 
three times the number of American casualties and greater mortality.92 
The statistics themselves were not entirely accurate, as the Adjutant 
General freely admitted, and were surely cited by Senator Cass out of 
political motivation.93 Nonetheless, they did inform and reflect the story 
being told in the United States. 
Newspapers carried articles citing success after success. 
Depending on their political affiliation, some lauded impressive victories, 
while others simply summarized battles with little fanfare. Take, for 
instance, the various portrayals of the Battle of Chapultepec, an assault 
on a fortress outside Mexico City in September 1847. As news of the battle 
became available, The New York Herald published a letter that described 
it as an encounter with "a large force of the enemy's best troops, ...in 
which the Mexicans received as usual a good thrashing." The author 
highlighted that Americans had "fought like devils," and that their 
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casualties were reportedly light.94 An article from The New Orleans 
Picayune, repeated in other major newspapers including that of Senator 
Calhoun's home state, described the same assault as "another battle and 
another... great American victory."95 Less sympathetic to the Democrats 
was The Emancipator of Boston, which tucked news of the conflict inside 
a piece emphasizing that the truce with Mexico was broken. The battle 
was regarded as "a terrible fight," but the author acknowledged that a 
small American band had prevailed over an impressive Mexican force.96 
No matter the wording, these articles conveyed a sense of 
accomplishment in the face of adversity. One expansionist even 
ventured that General Scott could set up his own empire at the behest of 
the United States. "You may laugh at this proposition; but think over it, 
and you will find it feasible. Scott has the men of daring with him, 
capable of any chivalrous achievement, and why should they not found 
an empire! ...Posterity would accredit them as the greatest of heroes."97 
It was particularly important to Democrats to emphasize that 
American gallantry was not a uniquely wartime phenomenon. 
Newspapers printed speeches by officers who elaborated on this 
deciding factor. American soldiers who had rallied in the face of 
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overwhelming odds reflected the indomitable American spirit. Soldiers 
best demonstrated the spirit through their impressive triumphs, but it was 
innate in every good citizen.98 The United States derived its strength 
through "the spirit and determination, union and energy of the American 
people."99 
Wartime success had proven American military capability, but it 
had further implications. The strength needed to defeat armies was easily 
interpreted as the same strength needed to occupy a nation. Gallantry 
on the battlefield translated to a broadly construed sense of power. 
Particularly with the Democratic emphasis on an intangible American 
spirit, the country's strength became at once vague and all-
encompassing. These were critical components to Americans' 
understandings of their own country. Combined with the way enemy 
resistance was described, Americans could hardly doubt that occupied 
Mexico would submit to American domination. 
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Domination over Mexico 
Having returned from the battlefields of Mexico near the end of the 
war, Generals Quitman and Shields addressed an audience at a New 
Orleans dinner party to celebrate the triumphs of American arms. But 
before General Shields launched into his commendation of the soldiers, 
he prefaced his speech by pointing out that Americans at home were 
"much too accustomed to underrate [Mexicans]."100 He recognized that 
vanquishing a weak and unworthy enemy hardly glorified the 
achievements of the vanquishers. However, his implication that Mexicans 
had been a threatening opponent may have been poorly received. 
The common assumption in the United States was that Mexico was 
unable to mount effective resistance. Among Democrats, it was popular 
to portray Mexicans as innocuous in multiple ways. Whigs, meanwhile, 
favored disputing the justness of the war over discussing the nature of the 
Mexican people. For them, the question was not whether or not the 
United States could take over Mexico, but whether or not it should do 
so.101 Yet significantly they did not challenge the claim that Mexico was 
defenseless. 
A primary criticism of the Mexican people was that they lacked 
fighting spirit. The Mexican government's refusal to back down and 
100
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accept peace with an army that had all but overrun its core provinces 
was dismissed as mere egotism. What to Mexicans was a point of honor 
was written off by Americans as "the obstinacy, the vanity, the pride, 
[and] the self-conceit of the Spaniards in exaggeration."102 Mexican ego 
was totally groundless, and Americans had nothing to fear.103 Colonel 
Albert C. Ramsey assured the readers of his article that, in Mexico, 
"patriotism and integrity were no more, its forms only observed... These 
fine phrases have descended to them like the armor of Alvorado, to be 
admired and exhibited to strangers, but... [useless] in a battle with our 
troops."104 
The apparent docility of the populace in territories under American 
control seemed to be proof that Mexican national pride was empty 
rhetoric. Mexicans ostensibly felt resigned to the American presence, and 
life went on undisturbed.'05 According to an article distributed by The 
American Star, the American newspaper established in Mexico City for 
the occupying forces, many Mexicans had even become accustomed 
to2 "What Is to Be Done?" The Philadelphia Ledger, cited in The Daily Ohio Statesman 
(Columbus, OH) 14 October 1847, 2. 
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and attached to American control.106 Indeed, Americans read in some 
articles that the processes through which Mexicans would be 
"Yankeefied" or "Yankeeised" had already begun.'07 That Mexicans 
could be a threat was unthinkable when they were apparently 
acclimating well to the occupation. The idea that Mexicans could and 
had adjusted to the American presence reinforced the innocuous 
Mexican image. 
Visible signs of Mexicans who were alienated by the American 
occupation were not treated seriously. For instance, when Texan units 
garrisoned a town, their reputation for brutality strained the occupiers' 
relationship with the locals. But rather than acknowledge this source of 
tension, one author joked that when Mexican men stayed in doors for fear 
of the Texans, it had "a salutary effect in one respect-that of making 
many good husbands."108 Not all Mexicans reacted quite so submissively 
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to the occupation, but even guerillas were belittled in the newspapers. 
Rather than portray them as resisters or tighting men, guerillas were 
labeled "rascals" whom the Americans would promptly defeat.109 
It was a point of pride that the United States was benevolent to the 
people they conquered, but even had General Scott established an 
oppressive regime, some went so far as to suggest that it was simply 
against Mexican nature to rise up and revolt. To Colonel Ramsay, the 
people of Mexico had defied logic since their discovery by Europeans, 
when they meekly submitted to the government and religion of a few 
hundred armed Spaniards. Even in recent history, despite bankruptcy, 
unpaid armies, and prevailing "dissension and discord," the populace 
appeared neither to rebel nor to seek to reform the government.110 In the 
wake of such history, that they would rise up now against the benign 
occupiers of the United States was unthinkable. 
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Whig politicians also made Mexicans seem less threatening by 
depicting them as helpless victims, but this motif was downplayed in Whig-
leaning periodicals.111 Whig newspapers single-mindedly concentrated 
on the injustice of the war in light of Christian values and standards for 
civilized conduct on the international stage. Nonetheless, when they 
occasionally confronted Democratic contentions containing common 
perceptions of Mexico, Whig authors did not object to the stereotypes. 
Observe what the writer took exception to when challenging this 
argument put forward in The New York Evening Post: 
'Now in this contest it appears to us very clear that the 
incompetency and utter inability of Mexico to maintain an 
independent existence-a decent existence as an independent 
power-have been made most manifestly apparent.' Could not 
Bonaparte have said the same after visiting the little republic of St. 
Marino? But did he therefore extinguish it?112 
The Whig author challenged the sufficiency of the Democrat's justification 
for annexation. He did not deny this scathing interpretation of Mexico; 
indeed, his statement could even be construed as likening Mexico's 
defense capability to that of St. Marino. But for him, Mexican failings did 
not justify annexation. 
Periodicals demonstrated a strong conviction that Mexico was no 
threat to the occupation, which, if true, had obvious, practical 
implications about the feasibility of American designs in that country. 
' " S e e Chapter I. 
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Indeed, they fixed American perceptions to regard Mexico as incapable 
of resistance. In contrast to the gallantry exhibited by American soldiers, 
Mexican behavior seemed like a dramatic counterpoint. American spirit 
came across as stronger. And trivializing present tensions between the 
occupiers and the Mexican populace set a precedent of downplaying 
opposition, causing this gap in gallantry to be impossible to bridge. 
America seemed capable of exercising its will over Mexico for as long as it 
occupied the country. 
American Superiority 
In addition to the battlefield news and political commentary that 
exhibited evidence of American gallantry and Mexican weakness, 
periodicals published articles that gave Americans a better understanding 
of the people with whom they were engaged in war. The popular 
perception, which Congressmen were not shy about expressing, was that 
Mexicans could best be characterized as a people inferior to 
Americans.1'3 Such an image held great bearing on American capability 
in Mexico. Newspapers advanced this conviction by emphasizing the 
disparity in civilized behavior between the two cultures, and by stating 
quite bluntly that Americans were, in fact, superior. 
1,3
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The obvious dissimilarities between the United States and Mexico 
were a subject of fascination and an inspiration to many authors. 
According to one writer, "That country is so strange in all things, that 
whatever is correctly written concerning it, must be equally so, and no less 
true. If it bore any resemblance to our own happy country, my pencil 
would neither attempt to pourtray [sic] any peculiarity of its features, nor 
any portion of its picture."114 
A number of authors wrote about these peculiarities to illustrate the 
cultural background of the people whose country the United States 
occupied. Some avoided judgment, though the facts themselves 
suggested a lack of sophistication. An article elaborating on the leperos, 
the urban poor of Mexico, did not suggest that these people were 
indicative of Mexican society as a whole; they were actually equated 
with counterparts in Italy and the United States. However, their number, 
"excesses," and "brutal and ignorant character" certainly cast aspersions 
on Mexican society.115 
Nor did all authors make any effort to be tactful. The Berkshire 
County Whig and The New York Herald both ran articles depicting how 
Mexican milk sellers took their livestock door to door, milking them to 
order. The Whig article treated the custom as interesting trivia and 
1,4
 Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes. Statistics, Observations, and Thoughts on the Civil 
Condition of Mexico," The New York Herald, 14 February 1848, 1. 
115
 "The Leperos," The Semi-Weekly Eagle (Brattleboro, VT), 26 October 1847, 3. 
55 
allowed the facts to speak for themselves, subtly reinforcing the image of 
Mexico as a primitive culture.116 But the author of the Herald piece 
presumed that this practice was done for fear of theft, and he proceeded 
to condemn the "natural villany [sic] of the people and their distrust of 
each other."1 !7 
This emphasis on difference naturally compelled Americans to 
compare the two cultures.118 When they looked to periodicals as sources, 
they based their comparisons on evidence that could engender only one 
logical conclusion. Newspaper articles reflected common stereotypes of 
an uncivilized Mexico and an enlightened United States, so one could 
only conclude that America was a superior nation. 
Some authors insinuated that Mexican culture was primitive and 
unsophisticated, but others were far more direct. The "ignorant, besotted 
and abject race" of Mexico was a prime target of merciless criticism.119 
An author for the Berkshire County Whig likened Mexicans to the 
"ignorant... Tartars" of Russia.120 In The New York Herald, the language 
116
 Particularly in light of spectacular American innovations in steam-driven 
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used to depict the Mexican reaction to Americans sounded not unlike the 
first exposure of a tribe deep in Africa to Europeans.121 
Religion, as well as race, was also a regular subject of reproach. 
Irish and South German immigration had amplified Anti-Catholic 
sentiment in American society at this time. Those who held the Catholic 
faith were regularly construed as ignorant, while the church itself was 
considered corrupt and decadent.122 Such attitudes were naturally 
echoed in the discussion of Mexico. Authors frequently condemned 
Mexican Catholicism as corrupt.123 Some viewed the people as inherently 
prone to vice and thus equally at fault.124 At worst, Mexican piety was 
considered to be so perverted as to qualify as Christianity only in name.125 
Conversely, the United States was described as a paragon among 
nations. The American Star reminded its readers, 
We should, one and all, regard ourselves as being, to a certain 
extent, representatives of free institutions and of an enlightened 
121
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republicanism, and endeavor to teach, by the force of example, to 
our enemies, those sound principles of religion, humanity and 
justice, which have gained for our country the high position which it 
occupies amonst [sic] the most prosperous and civilized nations.126 
The United States was said to boast remarkable enterprise, energy, and 
"some of the best and purest forms of Christianity [sic]."127 Some 
disagreed that the conduct of the United States was living up to those 
lofty ideals, but newspapers universally demonstrated pride for their 
bastion of "Christian civilization."128 
An observer who read these descriptions and sought to describe 
the relationship between the two cultures would presumably deduce that 
the United States was superior to Mexico. But in case there were any 
readers who had not yet made this connection, articles sympathetic to 
the major political factions pointed the relationship out specifically. The 
subject was broached in dialogue about the value of annexing of 
Mexico, and in arguments against Democratic stances. 
A number of expansionists expounded on the merits of annexing 
Mexico, which were based on a fundamental belief in American 
superiority. From a financial perspective, pragmatists pointed out the 
economic boost that would ensue when "the whole of that ignorant and 
malignant people [would] be set to work, in a proper way, under North 
126
 "Intelligence from the War Quarter Affairs in Mexico," The American Star, cited in The 
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American superintendence."129 From a humanitarian perspective, 
philanthropists insisted that it was America's duty to retain the country, 
because "Civilization, Christianity [sic], protest against this reflux of the 
[Mexican] tide of barbarism and anarchy."130 Annexation would thus lift 
Mexico out of the economic and cultural darkness and transform the 
nation into a functioning, profitable participant in the civilized world, 
under America's wing.131 
Many who disputed the supposedly intrinsic value of annexing 
Mexico did so even though they, too, prided themselves on American 
superiority and held contempt for Mexican inferiority. The disagreement 
arose because greater emphasis was placed on the latter aspect. They 
saw Mexican society as so deeply corrupt that it could not possibly be 
redeemed, and worried about its power to subvert the United States.132 
One author echoed a concern of Senator Calhoun, writing, "If we annex 
ten millions of Mexicans to the population of our Republic, thus giving 
them the power to shape, by their tawny Representatives in our National 
129
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Legislature, the policy of our country, will it be the most proper to say that 
we have conquered Mexico,-or that we have been conquered by 
her?"133 It was not worth risking the preservation of great American 
institutions and values by exposing them to the benighted Mexican 
people. 
And, once again, Whig authors overtly avoided challenging such 
common perceptions when disputing Democratic stances. Disagreeing 
with the contention that Mexican inferiority partly justified the war, one 
author wrote, "We do not care whether the inhabitants of Mexico are 
Spanish or Hottentots, whether they are white or black; one thing only we 
wish to know, and that is-has the United States acknowledged the 
nationality of Mexico?"134 In other words, as far as he was concerned, 
racial status held no bearing on the right to self-rule. Another author 
openly accepted the idea of Mexican inferiority and incorporated it into 
his argument, warning the United States to "flee from Mexico for our 
salvation, as Lot did from Sodom," lest this country descend into the same 
"mongrel, barbarous state."135 
Given the way differences between American and Mexican 
culture, both factual and perceived, were characterized, Americans 
inevitably decided that their society was significantly superior. Of course, 
133
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opinions about Mexican vice and barbarity and about American 
sophistication only directly commented on culture. Alone, each had no 
bearing on countries' power and capability. However, once the unequal 
relationship between the two countries was established regarding culture, 
it had implications across the board. If America was greater than Mexico 
in one realm, why not so in another? Battlefield successes and the 
progress of the occupation already seemed to verify that the American 
spirit was stronger than that of its enemy. Each confirmation of American 
superiority did much to bolster confidence in any American endeavor 
against Mexico, including the question of whether annexation of its 
extensive territories was something that the United States could 
accomplish. 
Conclusion 
Through newspaper articles, common perceptions about the United 
States and Mexico became evident, which gave good cause to be 
confident about America's capabilities in that country. Americans were 
depicted as civilized, spirited, and strong people. They came across as a 
vivid counterpoint to the allegedly weak, unsophisticated, and inferior 
Mexican populace. 
American fortitude was seen as beyond doubt. The combat 
record, which was regularly covered in the media, spoke for itself. 
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However, the extent of American strength was not necessarily limited to 
conventional warfare. The rhetoric of gallantry and spirit espoused by 
some newspapers particularly enforced the ubiquity of American power, 
which might be harnessed to accomplish even the most difficult tasks. 
Mexico, by comparison, seemed like innocuous or corrupt. Even 
Whigs, who condemned the plight of the Mexican people by American 
arms, did not contest that Mexico was powerless. The government 
exhibited unparalleled ego in its refusal to accept a peace, but the 
Mexican people appeared to be becoming resigned to the occupation. 
Indeed, Mexican history seemed to indicate that the population was 
inherently docile, even when under extreme duress. Those who did resist 
were hardly relevant threats, so the prospects for indefinite occupation 
seemed positive. 
Apparent American cultural superiority confirmed yet another way 
in which the United States trumped its southern neighbor. Whether by 
insinuating that the United States was more civilized than Mexico, or by 
actually coming out and saying it, newspaper articles left no question as 
to which society was superior. Although this conclusion had no direct 
implications on American capabilities, when considered in conjunction 
with apparent American power and Mexican weakness, it indicated that 
American superiority might be true across the board. This, too, 
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contributed to a broad understanding of American power and its 
capabilities toward Mexico. 
As partisan sources, newspapers reflected the content and 
structure of contemporary political stances. The perceptions of American 
strength and Mexican weakness, evidenced in periodicals, informed the 
positions that American politicians took, and were often fundamental to 
those positions. People who accepted these portrayals had every reason 
to believe that Mexico's fate was in America's hands, which explains why 
politicians did not challenge the feasibility of annexing Mexico. 
Yet the contents of newspaper articles held ramifications for more 
than just Washington politics. The perceptions outlined in periodicals 
reached far beyond the political sphere. Newspapers were in touch with 
American society, as sources that both reflected and influenced popular 
ideas. Therefore, ideas that engendered confidence in America's ability 
to permanently dominate Mexico were spread across the country. 
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Jiffair or fiattle. 
1. Detachment under Capt. 
Thornton, 2d dragoons, 
in a reconnaissance on 
the Rio Grande, above 
Fo i tBrown, T e x a s . . . , 
2. Detachment of Captain 
Walker's Texas Ran-
gers, near Point Isabel, 
" . M o n t e r e y . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . 
SV Brazilo, New Mex ico . . . 
9, Los Angfelos, California, 
10. La Canada, New Mex.. . 
18. Calaboso,Cal-,DeRu8sy, 
22. On Major Lally's march, 
28. Atlisco . ; . . . . . . . . 
T o t a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Date. 
April 25,1646 . . . . . 
May 4 to May 9 . . . 
May 8 . . . 
May 9 
Sept. 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 . . . . 




March 11 to 2 9 , . . , 
April 18 
July 12 
Sept. 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 . . . . 
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Remarks. 
•killed & wounded, 
•killed & wounded. 
•killed & wounded, 
•killed & wounded, 
•killed & wounded, 
•killed & wounded. 
•killed & wounded. 
•killed & wounded. 
FIGURE 3: 
This is the table of battle statistics prepared for the Senate by the Adjutant 
General. Senator Cass had good reason to be proud of the information 
depicted here. Despite regularly facing a more numerous foe, victory 
never escaped the American grasp. Such spectacular military success 
was a central part of the contemporary American understanding of the 
war. 
Congressional Globe 87. 
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CHAPTER III 
AMERICAN SOLDIERS' PERCEPTIONS AND THE OCCUPATION OF MEXICO 
Once Mexico City was in American hands and the military settled to 
the task of maintaining the occupation, one author asserted, "They have 
run over Mexico without overcoming it - They have seized a territory which 
they cannot keep, and charged themselves with the responsibility of a 
government which can offer them neither profit or [sic] advantage. They 
have not acquired a nation by conquering a territory."'36 Some may 
have found this argument compelling where the article was originally 
published, in England.137 But this sobering interpretation of the limitations 
of the American occupation found little sympathy west of the Atlantic. As 
the earlier chapters have shown, commonly held stereotypes about 
Mexico and the United States made a convincing case that Mexico could 
be dominated, for better or for worse. 
As testament to how entrenched this sentiment was in American 
society, it was held not only by those distanced from the war, but also by 
the fighting men who participated in the occupation. Sometimes in the 
136
 "The Entente Cordiale—The Policy of Europe—The Position of the United States," The 
Liverpool Mercury, cited in The New York Herald, 13 November 1847, 1. 
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 This article may also have been wishful thinking. As mentioned in Chapter I, the British 
were resigned to the American domination of Mexico. 
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face of compelling evidence fo the contrary, many soldiers confirmed 
Mexico to be a corrupt state primarily comprised of poor, apathetic 
people who readily submitted to any authority, and who accepted the 
United States as an outstanding country whose civilized, masculine people 
could achieve great feats and overcome almost any obstacle. They 
often applied this knowledge to show that the occupation of Mexico was 
quite successful, and potentially practicable in the long term. Their 
writings gave little cause to doubt the feasibility of annexing the country. 
Of course most soldiers did not concern themselves with the exact 
outcome of victory, so long as the honor and dignity of the United States 
were satisfied. The diaries, journals, letters, anecdotes, and memoirs that 
they left behind remind us that American soldiers were fighters, patriots, 
and at times tourists, but rarely politicians. They focused on the 
sensational and the unique, writing about battles, heroics, sights in an 
exotic environment, and the culture of an alien people. Their musings, 
based on real and invented notions of Mexican and American societies, 
do not shed light on all of the factors that would play a part in annexing 
Mexico, but they do suggest that the territory would be advantageous, 
the population would not react negatively, and American gallantry and 
ingenuity would help carry the day. 
This chapter makes use of twenty sources written by soldiers in the 
American army who campaigned in places that were not annexed but 
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stood to be if the all Mexico movement had succeeded.138 The sample 
consists of men who came from different backgrounds and who 
occupied different positions in the army.139 However, the sources reveal 
remarkably common perceptions of Mexico and American capability, 
regardless of each soldier's circumstances. 
The one exception was disagreement over the contribution of the 
volunteers to the occupation. A great deal of tension existed between 
volunteers and regulars. The government saw the need to supplement 
the small regular army with volunteers, but professional soldiers largely did 
not. Volunteers were detested for rejecting military discipline, being 
rowdy and stealing battlefield glory.140 But there was no love lost. 
Volunteers saw the military establishment as undemocratic, if not 
tyrannical, and the professional "who follows it for a livelihood, in peace 
and war, in garrison and in camp, has need for only so much brains as will 
138
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enable him to stand erect, keep his clothing and tent clean and neat, 
and his arms bright."'41 Their accusations of one another during the 
invasion must therefore be taken with a grain of salt. 
Logistics 
Before attempting to 'win the hearts and minds' of the locals and 
other cliche tasks that befall an army of occupation, strategists first must 
face the challenge of fielding and maintaining a large number of soldiers 
across a foreign country. Success or failure hinges on two main factors at 
this most basic level. The army must establish control over areas from 
where it can oversee the population, and it needs to keep the soldiers 
supplied and in good spirits. When writing about marches and the cities 
they occupied, soldiers showed that Mexico was a favorable environment 
for achieving these goals. 
Large American armies marched in force across two different 
regions in Mexico during the war: the northern states of Coahuila and 
Tamaulpas including the important cities Monterrey and Tampico, and 
the Camino Real from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. Both areas were difficult 
landscapes for an army to travel through, and staying supplied was 
critical. Officers who mentioned the quartermaster department in their 
141
 "Suffered from Tyranny pracficed, had the right of American soldiers trampled on by 
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accounts were disappointed by its inefficiency, and the army had to look 
to locals to procure provisions.142 Fortunately for the Americans, 
according to those concerned about supplies, goods were abundant 
and trading was quite successful in both regions, providing both Taylor's 
and Scott's large forces with ample supplies to march the hefty distances 
from city to city.143 If Mexicans hesitated to trade with the invaders. 
United States forces could and did exercise coercion to persuade them 
otherwise.144 When soldiers suggested that troop movements on an 
invasion scale could be adequately supplied and executed, movements 
on a smaller occupation scale seemed quite feasible. 
In an occupation, the need to travel and spread out across Mexico 
could be avoided because of the way soldiers understood the country to 
be organized. Several noted that Mexico was sparsely populated and 
that most Mexicans lived in cities, claims backed up by common 
142
 The Quartermaster's Dept. was "woefully conducted." George B. McClellan, The 
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descriptions of empty countryside and bustling towns.145 Mountain passes 
in both areas of operation made Private Samuel Chamberlain write that 
"Mexico is made for picket duty."146 The implication of these observations 
was that Mexico could be controlled from key cities and strategic 
points.147 In outlining his plan for occupation while waiting for peace, 
General Scott put the idea into words. "Many of the States of this 
republic, on account of their remoteness from the common centre, 
sparseness of population, and inability to pay more than a trifle in the way 
of contributions, are not worth being occupied. Their influence on the 
question of peace or war is, proportionally, inconsiderable."148 
The logistics of maintaining garrisons in these cities seemed, from 
soldiers' accounts, practical. Like early travel writers, they depicted the 
town and its environs, giving some idea about the supply situation they 
faced. In contrast to the stark countryside, Americans were impressed 
with the fertile, cultivated land around populated areas.149 The fruits of 
145
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these surroundings could be purchased in any season at busy local 
markets.150 In every major city Americans passed through during the war, 
the size of these markets and the variety and abundance ot goods being 
sold impressed all of the soldiers who wrote of them.151 One soldier 
succinctly recorded that throughout the campaign the army "found 
supplies of all descriptions" with "comparative ease."152 
Soldiers reported that Mexican cities occupied by the Americans 
provided amenities as well as goods, keeping the occupying forces 
cultivated." William Preston, Journal in Mexico (Privately printed, n.d.), 20. "In, and 
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happy. "Here we were furnished with every comfort, every convenience, 
that soldiers in a foreign land could expect or ask for," wrote a soldier 
during his stay in Tampico.153 Festivities like fandangos were frequent and 
popular events among the men, although officers often disapproved of 
the revelry that ensued.154 Both local theaters and newly established 
American theaters catered to large audiences in major Mexican cities.155 
Soldiers stationed in Mexico City could even frequent the nearby "resort 
town" of St. Augustine.156 George McClellan, better known for his exploits 
in the Civil War, wrote that in Tampico he spent "some of the happiest 
hours of my life."157 Even during wartime, in a place far away from home, 
soldiers who participated in the occupation could relax and enjoy 
themselves, ostensibly decreasing the risk of desertion and facilitating a 
lengthy occupation. 
'53 Furber 393. 
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just an excuse for lots of people to gather and revel. Donnavan 17. Fandangos "have 
but one object in view, and that enjoyment." L. A. Norton, Life and Adventures of Col. L 
A. Norton (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press Publishing House, 1887), 115. Officers instead went 
to "respectable balls," though like enlisted men at fandangos, some "made a regular 
frolic of it... and all got high." Dana 179. 
155
 At Tampico were "a company of American actors, engaged in carrying on the 
'American Theatre;' and pretty well they do also, and obtain each night crowded 
houses." Furber 413. "A company of theatrical performers, who had been with General 
Taylor s army in Monterey [sic] and Matamoras, [had]... officers and soldiers crowding 
the theatre every night to overflowing." Autobiography of an English Soldier 140. "What 
do you think of an American Theatrical Company opening in the City of Puebla!!" 
Anderson 202. The Teatro de Santa Anna in Mexico City became the National Theatre 
and drew large American audiences. J. M. Wynkoop ed., Anecdotes and Incidents 
(Pittsburgh, 1848), 19. 
156 Collins 91. 
'57 McClellan 51. 
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Soldiers' portrayals of logistics were both expressions of American 
confidence and justifiable conclusions derived from experiences and 
insight. On one hand, given the concentration of population, the cities 
that American forces occupied probably were effective control nexuses 
that allowed American forces to oversee strategically important regions. 
Most Americans' descriptions of markets and amenities may have only 
partially described the supply situation, omitting issues of supply lines, 
military equipment, manpower and desertion, but these were the 
concerns of strategists, not ordinary soldiers. On the other hand, it is telling 
that soldiers did not worry about the logistics of occupying Mexico, which 
to the layman might seem to be a monumental task. There is no question 
that their portrayal of logistics played into the overall positive analysis of 
the occupation. 
The Mexican Response to Occupation 
Captain Anderson warned of a potential obstacle to occupying 
Mexico in a letter to his wife. He wrote that if the Mexican people 
became incensed at the American presence, "hence would result an 
enthusiasm which would render the country unconquerable. Every City 
and Town might then fall before the force of our Arms, and still we would 
meet with enemies in every mountain recess, and behind every burn." He 
went on to explain that this would not happen due to the beneficent 
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occupation policies of the United States.158 Nonetheless, by just admitting 
the possibility of Mexican unrest, Anderson demonstrated superior insight 
over many of his peers. Unlike most Americans, Anderson had traveled in 
Latin America before and was less apt to accept common stereotypes 
about the people.159 Most American soldiers believed that Mexicans 
were a cowardly, lazy race, and sometimes depicted them as less than 
human. It followed that such a people would not react aggressively to 
occupation, and that was indeed how locals were portrayed as 
American forces marched into Mexican cities. 
It is not astonishing that Mexico and the United States did not have 
a friendly cultural exchange in the middle of hostilities. However, wartime 
animosity only partly fueled a stereotype which drew on deep racial and 
religious divides between Anglo-Saxons and mestizos. On the battlefield, 
Mexican soldiers were seen as inferior to and less masculine than their 
opponents from the north.160 They were not even "half the men the 
American soldiers are," one soldier proclaimed to his wife.161 Battle after 
battle, American forces racked up victories despite usually facing a 
158
 Anderson 24. 
159
 Captain Anderson mentioned in passing having witnessed holiday ceremonies in 
Bogota before the war. Anderson 197. 
160
 "Cowardly as they [Mexicans] universally are..." Donnavan 24. Mexican soldiers were 
"poor miserable cowards." Dana 128. A battle loomed ahead, "but we had strong 
ground for hope in the positive cowardice of the Mexicans, our own comparative 
courage, and the superior skill of General Scott." "The Mexican lancers exhibited most 
characteristically both their cowardice and cruelty of disposition." Autobiography of an 
English Soldier 185, 258. 
'«' Dana 129. 
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numerically superior opponent in difficult terrain. Mexican cowardice was 
not only verified by these outcomes but, as Lieutenant General Franklin 
Pierce insisted, critical to them.162 
Racist sentiment was even more evident when American soldiers 
discussed Mexicans as people rather than as fighters. Several openly 
condemned Mexicans as "the laziest people in existence" or as "ignorant, 
indolent, inefficient creatures."163 Others who were less hostile merely 
lamented the miserable state of Mexicans, whose lot was worse than that 
of slaves.164 Some soldiers thought that this degraded existence indicated 
that Mexicans were subhuman, and portrayed them as primitive and 
even animalistic.165 
The Mexicans whom American soldiers depicted were not the sort 
to stand up to an American occupation. Even if the Mexican race was 
not inherently dull and apathetic, centuries under the foot of the Catholic 
162
 Musing over how his men had taken a defensible position with only light casualties, 
Lieutenant General Franklin Pierce wrote, "Had they [the Mexican force] possessed 
courage and skill in these of arms, our loss must have been very great." Letter from 
Franklin Pierce, n.d.. General Scott and His Staff 141. 
!<3 McClellan 11-12, Donnavan 24. 
164
 Preston graphically portrayed Mexicans as utterly wretched and pathetic "inmates" of 
hell. Preston 37-8. "The common laborers of the Country are slaves more lost in every 
point of view than our negroes." Anderson 270. A Tennessee man meticulously outlined 
seven reasons why a peon was worse off than a slave. Furber 606. Both were clearly 
commenting on the issue of slavery as much as the plight of Mexicans, but their 
comments remain valuable descriptions of the perceived Mexican standard of living. 
165
 This soldier suggested that Mexicans could not comprehend the idea of foreigners, 
thinking Americans were "strange, wild-looking, hairy faced savages of the half horse 
and half alligator breed." Autobiography of an English Soldier 138. Primitive Mexicans 
were portrayed as awestruck at the steamer Ontario, fearing it was alive and might 
annihilate them. Donnavan 16. "The inhabitants [were] little above savages." Tennery 
37. "Five, out of its seven millions of inhabitants, are beasts of burden, with as little of 
intellect as the asses whose burdens they share." Letter from Major General Quitman, 15 
October 1847, Genera/ Scott and His Staff (102-5). 
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Church and Spanish dons meant to Americans that society had 
accl imated to despotic conditions.166 Who held the authority did not 
matter. A volunteer frankly asserted, "I believe the majority are alike 
indifferent whether the Great Mogul or James K. Polk rules over them, 
provided they can sell their grapes, peaches, corn and red peppers, and 
smoke their segars [sic] in peace."167 
It is an unsurprising coincidence, then, that American soldiers' 
accounts did not depict an aggressive or lasting negative local reaction 
when they first entered Mexican cities. Some described the population as 
outright welcoming. The Mexicans that Americans encountered were 
"exceedingly polite and accommodat ing," and "fraternized with the 
'Yankees' in the pleasantest manner."168 On the road to Mexico City, 
Jalapans were "hospitable" and "friendly to the Americans."169 Pueblans 
turned out on the streets and in and upon the houses like a "New York 
crowd on some celebration day - turning the New Yorkers into some 
resemblance to Florida Indians."170 Americans were received into Mexico 
City so joyously, wrote one soldier, that he felt like they were being 
166
 Mexicans "have for three hundred years depended on a monarchical and despotic 
government." Donnavan 62. "They bend their necks to the yoke of the Spanish dons, 
without thinking of their miserably degraded state. It will take a century to rouse them 
from their torpor and to make them feel that they are free." Anderson 270. Mexicans still 
worshiped even though "charity is reserved for the priest and is not to be bestowed on 
suffering humanity." Preston 37. "The millions are steeped in ignorance, vice, and 
poverty, abject to the priests and trampled to the dust by the wealthy." Smith 154. 
167
 Account of an unnamed volunteer, General Scott and His Staff 176. 
168
 Furber 404, Grant 118. 
169
 Donnavan 101, Autobiography of an English Soldier 205. 
170
 Anderson 174. 
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welcomed home; an odd welcome considering that a day-long shootout 
with snipers began shortly thereafter.171 Zacatecas, a city that remained 
in Mexican control throughout the war, even had a sizeable group who 
eagerly anticipated the arrival of American forces, according to a 
prisoner of war held there.172 
Some descriptions in other accounts or of different cities portrayed 
a simply passive Mexican population. Several soldiers were struck by how 
apathetic civilians were about the war, offering no resistance to the 
American invasion.173 When the soldiers came, citizens in Tampico, 
Jalapa, Camargo, and Amazoque seemed to carry on with their lives as 
usual, not welcoming nor reviling the Americans.174 If anyone had cause 
for anger at the United States military, it was the citizens of Vera Cruz, who 
endured a long bombardment and were refused by General Scott an 
171
 "As the Mexicans marched out on one side ot the city, we marched in from the other, 
and from the evidence of joy at meeting us, I could not help thinking that they thought 
we must have been there before. White flags were waving from every window, and 
every balcony was crowded with ladies, all welcoming us and waving their white 
handkerchiefs at us." Norton 173-4. 
172
 "A peace party, numbering among its members many native citizens of influence and 
wealth... was awaiting with much anxiety the appearance of Gen. Taylor and his army, 
whose advance upon the place was then daily anticipated." Donnavan 50. 
173 "when we reached sight of the city [Tampico] there were Mexicans enough gathered 
on the landing to have driven us back with clubs and stones, if they had had the spirit to 
have done so, but they offered no resistance and we boldly disembarked and took the 
town." Collins 42. Another town was taken very easily, without resistance or disturbance. 
Norton 152. "The apathy in relation to the war, however, in the whole Mexican 
territory..." Samuel Francis Du Pont, Official Dispafches and Leffers of Rear Admiral Du 
Ponf (Wilmington, DE: Press of Ferris Brothers, 1883), 12. 
174
 At Tampico, "They seem to evince no dissatisfaction at our presence." Anderson 21. 
Locals in Jalapa "appeared perfectly indifferent to us, manifesting neither pleasure nor 
sorrow at our approach." McClellan 91. "The people [of Camargo] appear quiet and 
inoffensive..." Curtis 126. "The inhabitants [of Amazoque] were not at all alarmed by our 
approach." The streets remained crowded and trade stayed in full swing. Smith 162. 
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opportunity to evacuate the women and children. But on survivors' taces, 
wrote Captain Anderson, "the countenance bore more of sadness and 
sorrow than of anger."175 
Those who did not initially welcome or tolerate the Americans were 
characterized as being understandably fearful of the invading army. 
Some citizens in Tampico, Marin, Cerralvo, Puebla, and Mexico City shut 
themselves up in their homes or fled to the countryside, but once these 
people discovered that they had nothing to fear from American soldiers, 
they too seemed to come around and accept the army's presence.'76 
Just days after the chaotic combat in Mexico City, General Scott 
optimistically reported that, "families are now generally returning; business 
of every kind has been resumed, and the city is already tranquil and 
cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and 
trifling) of our gallant troops."177 No matter which way the soldiers wrote 
that they were received, Mexican civilians seemed to cause little trouble 
for the occupying forces. 
' "Anderson 103. 
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 Some in Tampico "shut themselves up in their houses as if in a state of siege," but not 
long afterward the city became "bustling and animated." Autobiography of an English 
Soldier 138-9. "Both this place [Marin] and Cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, 
women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; 
but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must 
have given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos - 'the Yankees.'" Grant 107. "The 
inhabitants [of Puebla] are fast losing their false impressions and becoming reconciled to 
us." Smith 168. "The people [of Mexico City] began to make their appearance upon the 
streets without fear of the invaders." Grant 164. 
177
 Winfield Scott, report on operations after the battle of Molina del Rey, General Scott 
and His Staff 67. 
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Ordinary Mexicans left behind too little evidence to gauge exactly 
how accepting they were of the occupation, but American soldiers' 
accounts of the population's response fitted too conveniently with their 
racist views of Mexicans to be taken as gospel. It is difficult to believe that 
some of the Mexican populace did not feel some sense of nationalism 
and react angrily to their country's occupation by gr'mgos.u8 However, 
soldiers were convinced that they had accurately appraised the 
population's inherent racial and social traits. Although some tentatively 
questioned portions of widely held stereotypes, none disagreed that they 
held elements of truth and that Mexicans were, on the whole, a 
submissive people.179 As a result, American soldiers were confident that 
Mexicans would provide little resistance to the occupation. 
American Conduct 
General Scott's "very few and trifling" exceptions betrayed a flaw in 
the otherwise sparkling American conduct in Mexico City: the behavior of 
volunteers. Washington deemed the United States Army in 1846 to be 
178
 The snipers who targeted American troops parading through Mexico City seem like 
glaring examples of this attitude, though Americans did not consider them representative 
of the townspeople as a while. Grant described the shootings as "the hostile acts of 
liberated convicts." Grant 163. Norton neglected to mention the firefight altogether in 
his description of entering the city. Norton 174. 
179
 Furber qualified the stereotype that Mexicans were stupid by writing, "Mexican 
children are always more precocious and brighter than those of our country at the same 
age. One is astonished at the genius and talent exhibited by the boys at from eight to 
fourteen years of age; but at that age they become dull and stupid, and so afterward 
continue." Furber 609. The stereotype of Mexican idleness applied to men, but "any 
person who thinks the Mexicans cannot be industrious should see these girls washing in 
Jalapa." Autobiography of an English Soldier 208. 
79 
unable to adequately prosecute the war alone, so President Polk 
appealed to the states to create volunteer regiments to fill the ranks. 
General Taylor perceptively noted, "Volunteers were never intended to 
invad [sic] or carry on war out of the limits of their own country, but should 
be used, as the constitution intended they should be for enforcing the 
execution of the laws; & repelling invasion, for which they are admirably 
suited."180 What these men had in patriotism and courage, professional 
soldiers and volunteers alike knew they lacked in orderly conduct in a 
foreign country. Volunteers admitted their undisciplined behavior, but 
rather than consider its implications on the occupation, they emphasized 
its importance to being a good American. Regulars, not to pass up an 
opportunity to criticize their more publicized and popular comrades-in-
arms, freely condemned the volunteers for their gross misconduct. Yet the 
professional soldiers also downplayed its harm to the occupation, by 
putting the problem in the context of the Mexican experience and 
portraying it as something that could be overcome. On the whole, 
regulars and volunteers agreed that the American occupation provided 
a level of justice, stability, and protection that had been unknown under 
the Mexican government. 
According to the regulars, the "malditos volunteros" gained quite a 
reputation in Mexico and were "objects of special detestation" among 
!so Taylor 51. 
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the people.'81 The Mexicans knew their arrival meant trouble.182 While 
occupying towns, volunteers behaved "in a most shameful and 
disgraceful manner" by gambling, drinking, vandalizing, and being noisy 
and rowdy.183 Guards had to be stationed with fixed bayonets at "places 
of amusement" just to try to keep volunteers in line.184 Regular soldiers 
reported that unruly behavior even resulted in murders. Lethal skirmishes 
with locals and guerillas led volunteers to commit vengeance killings 
among the local populace.185 Some Texan volunteers gained such a 
reputation for brutality that one regular soldier wrote, "[the] fearful 
atrocities committed by them now form part of the Nursery Legends of the 
country."18* 
181
 Autobiography of an English Soldier 138. 
182
 "Until the Volunteers came, the citizens appeared inclined to be sociable. But now 
many have left, and gone into the interior." Anderson 12. People from Jalapa were 
"friendly to the Americans, yet dreaded the presence of a large body of volunteers in 
the town..." Autobiography of an English Soldier 205. "The consequences of these things 
[volunteer misconduct] is a great many families have left their homes and gone into the 
interior and a great many more will leave. The common people are also scared and 
many of them have left." Dana 152. 
183
 "The volunteers carry on in a most shameful and disgraceful manner." McClellan 18. 
Volunteers gambled, drank at bars, and arrested locals willy-nilly. Chamberlain 58, 75. 
"The Theatre is filled with noisy Volunteers some of whom are taken away from their frolics 
there every night and given a place on the floor of our filthy guardhouse." Anderson 46. 
"The wild volunteers as soon as beyond the Rio Grande, committed, with impunity, all 
sorts of atrocities on the persons and property of Mexicans." Scott 392. 
184 "At all places of amusement are found sentinels with their fixed bayonets; they are 
even on the ballroom floor. And this is necessary to keep our free and independent 
citizens in order!" Anderson 47. 
185
 Chamberlain gave a fantastic and almost certainly exaggerated account of the 
'Massacre at the Cave,' where Arkansas cavalry supposedly butchered and scalped 
Mexicans in retribution for a guerilla killing. Chamberlain 88. Twenty-five Louisville Legion 
volunteers "went out regularly to work to murder Mexicans because one of their men 
had been killed in a drunken outrage among the Mexicans." Dana 152. "They think 
nothing of robbing and killing the Mexicans." McClellan 18. 
186
 Chamberlain 177. 
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Of course regulars, frustrated with the volunteer presence, had 
reason to exaggerate some of this unruly behavior. An officer of the Ohio 
Volunteers politely wrote of their prejudice that, "I have always been 
proud of our regular army, but there are some small minds in all places 
and even good men do not all seem to regard with generous equality 
those who have volunteered to leave their homes and business to 
cooperate with them."187 He believed that regulars had inflated the 
actions of a few, because if volunteer misconduct was really so bad, most 
Mexicans would have scattered and Americans would be up in arms.188 
However these stories held some degree of truth because volunteers 
confirmed their own undisciplined conduct in their accounts.189 
This sort of behavior contradicted the army's occupation policy, but 
volunteers justified their disobedience as a virtue. These citizen soldiers 
were "fully equal" to the regulars, but "a volunteer here, in every little 
matter of ceremony, will not be bound down, as a regular is obliged to 
be."190 Not being forced to obey was essential to freedom, so choosing 
187
 Curtis 31-2 
188
 "The faults of the few will at tach to the entire corps." If even just ten of his men made 
an effort to cause trouble, "this town would be in the greatest terror. The Mexicans 
would scatter to the four winds, and all the Americans in town would cry out in horror, 
'look at the d d volunteers, they are unfit for service.'" Curtis 92. 
189
 Tennery confirmed volunteer rioting, drinking, revelry, and poor discipline. Tennery 18, 
68, 78. A group of Arkansas volunteers proudly publicized the vengeance killings they 
committed. Wynkoop 91. Colonel Norton went into explicit detail about how he and a 
comrade enjoyed tantalizing Mexicans with coins that they had heated in a coal brazier. 
After getting bored of that game, they then dumped water and flour from a balcony all 
over the beggars that they had attracted. Norton 197-8. He also admitted that a "spirit 
of vandalism pervaded the army" at Mexico City. Norton 179. 
'
9o Furber 433. 
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whether or not to follow superior officers' orders was fundamentally 
American.191 
Professional soldiers criticized the lack of discipline that this mentality 
on military obedience encouraged, but they were not worried that 
volunteer misconduct would compromise the occupation. Some soldiers, 
whose task was to fix the problem, praised the measures that the army 
had taken to maintain order. Units were organized to police the streets 
and reduce crime. On a judicial level, military tribunals were created to 
try and punish the soldiers who had committed transgressions. According 
to their accounts, both were successful in repairing the damage done to 
Mexicans' confidence.192 
Despite the issue of discipline in the ranks, both regulars and 
volunteers who were inclined to write about the achievements of the 
occupation were convinced that the army had established excellent 
stability. Numerous officers reported that the Mexican people were better 
191
 An anecdote emerged from the war that demonstrated well how not being bound by 
convention had become fused with patriotism. At a show at the National Theater in 
Mexico City, volunteers raucously harassed the bewildered Mexican performers. When 
the band eventually played the United States national anthem to calm their audience 
down, the rowdy bunch was portrayed as American heroes. Wynkoop 19. For more 
discussion of how not being bound by convention and military discipline had become 
fused with patriotism, see Ricardo Herrera, "Self Governance and the American Citizen 
Soldier," The Journal of Military History vol. 65, no. 1 (2001), 32-33. 
192
 "These measures [patrols] tended to assure the inhabitants of General Scott's good 
intentions; and in a very short time the most complete confidence was restored." 
Autobiography of an English Soldier 268. "It [the tribunal system] has been admitted by 
all that the order worked like a charm; that it conciliated Mexicans; intimidated the 
vicious of the several races, and being executed with impartial rigor, gave the highest 
moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army." Scott 396. Captain 
Anderson portrayed his work in tribunals as helpful in resolving the issue. Anderson 300. 
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off under American administration than they had been under their own 
government, and that most of the populace appreciated the change.193 
Several mentioned that local Mexican leaders formally thanked American 
occupation officials for their efforts to establish peace and justice.194 Two 
even suggested that Mexicans under the occupation were in some ways 
better off than American civilians back home!195 Captain Anderson 
provided perspective to the issue of misconduct, writing, "I fear that there 
are occasional violations of Genl. Scott's orders, on the part of the 
Volunteers, and in a small way, on the part of the Regulars, but all these 
193
 "The city was well governed and the natives themselves admitted that they felt more 
secure in their persons and property than they did when they had the government in 
their own hands." Collins 43. "I think that as tar as I can see the laboring Mexicans care 
very little about the War, and that, by a continuance of this course, after a few months 
they will feel more secure in their persons and property than they have ever been under 
their own authorities." Anderson 147-8. "Good order, or the protection of religion, 
persons, property, and industry were coextensive with the American rule... Mexicans 
had never before known equal prosperity... Intelligent Mexicans, and, indeed, the great 
body of the people, felt and acknowledged the happy change." Scott 580-1. "I believe 
a majority of the better citizens were looking forward to the occupation of the city by the 
American forces, as their only hope of security against the thieving propensities of the 
Mexican soldiery, who infested it." Donnavan 97. "In fact, under the humane policy of 
our commander, I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not 
regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Property and person 
were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the 
country such as the people had never enjoyed before." Grant 118. Honorable conduct 
had a noticeable effect on the Mexican public. Autobiography of an English Soldier 211. 
194
 In a letter, a Mexican Prefect thanked an American Captain and praised the conduct 
of his men for mounting a raid on a nearby tribe of "savages" to recover animals and 
property plundered from local Mexicans. Jose Ignacio Arrabe to Captain Reid, 18 May 
1847, General Scott and His Staff 185. A pair of Alcaldas "called on me and spoke of 
giving some kind acknowledgement of my services and kindness to the inhabitants." 
Curtis 206. 
,95
 "I will venture the assertion, without fear of contradiction, that, in no City of the same 
size, either in our own blessed Country or in any other, is private property, or are private 
rights, more secure and better guarded than here." Anderson 272. "It seems the rights of 
these Mexicans are better guaranteed than the rights of our citizens in the states would 
be." Curtis 32. 
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combined amount to much less than they have been compelled to bear 
from their own soldiery."196 
Soldiers ignored the hypocrisy of claiming that Americans had 
established peace, justice and stability, while admitting that volunteers 
had committed actions that seriously violated each. They also 
downplayed the damage volunteer misconduct did to Mexican-
American relations in occupied territories, evidenced by Mexican leeriness 
of these citizen soldiers. Instead, Americans maintained their confident 
assessment of the occupation by neglecting volunteer misbehavior when 
it was convenient to, making it seem surmountable or justifiable, and 
qualifying their misdeeds as somehow less egregious than those 
committed by the former Mexican authorities. Volunteer rowdiness was 
apparently just a minor blemish on a campaign that had, overall, 'won 
the hearts and minds' of the people. 
Resistance 
Given the professed success of the occupation in conciliating the 
Mexican people, it might have seemed hard to explain the sizable guerilla 
movement in the countryside. American soldiers were aware of the 
scope of guerilla activity and of the trouble an active resistance could 
cause, but they were also convinced that these men were not resisters. 
196
 Anderson 147-8. 
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Instead, guerillas were roving groups of bandits with no support among 
upstanding Mexican citizens. The bandits were no threat to the 
occupation; they merely amounted to a nuisance that could be 
overcome. 
When it became apparent that the Mexican Army could not repel 
the invaders, American troops heard news that Mexican authorities had 
taken major steps to encourage resistance.'97 Captain Anderson thought 
it unlikely that the populace would enthusiastically commence full scale 
guerilla warfare, but already many guerillas roamed the countryside.198 
Many soldiers emphasized the raiders' numbers or their threat to American 
communication lines.199 If this constituted the core of a Mexican 
m
 Captain Anderson copied a printed and circulated declaration of resistance from the 
Mexican Congress that emphasized the people's resolve. Anderson 269. "The best 
informed Mexicans in this section of the country, with whom I have conversed, say there 
will be no peace; that eleven of the states of Mexico had united to carry on the war in 
the best way they could." Taylor 148-9. "Since the battle of Cerro Gordo, the Mexican 
Congress have passed a law making it treason for any one to propose peace, in fact, 
declaring perpetual war." Smith 144. "My impression is that a general order has been 
issued by the rebel authorities to carry on a guerilla warfare in all directions." Du Pont 
223. 
198
 "I do not believe that the Mexicans will attempt a game in which they are so certain 
of being the heaviest losers." Anderson 161. 
199
 "Guerrilla bands... infest every part of the road to Vera Cruz." Anderson 314. "Small 
bands of robbers... infest the greater portion of the inhabited parts of this unfortunate 
country." "The robbers are still infesting the road between this [Monterrey] and Rio 
Grande." Taylor 94, 149. Along the Camino Real, "the whole country thereabouts was 
swarming with guerrillas." Norton 186. "The roads are filled with bands of robbers under 
the name of guerillas." Smith 153. In the countryside outside Camargo, many "straggling 
parties of armed Mexicans were frequently seen prowling about in that vicinity." 
Donnavan 25. "The highways used, or about to be used, by the 
American troops, being still infested in many parts by those atrocious bands called 
guerillas or rancheros..." Scott 574. "Frequent depredations of numerous guerilla parties 
upon the wagon trains of the American army, passing between Cerralvo and 
Monterey..." Guerrilla chief Father Jarauta's "frequent depredations upon American 
trains passing between Vera Cruz and the capital, has raised him to an unenviable 
notoriety." Wynkoop 51, 100. The Mexican leader Canales threatened lines of 
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resistance, one soldier worried that it "may prolong it [the war] to an 
almost indefinite period, unless a new degree of energy shall be infused 
into American forces."200 
Yet the guerillas were not part of an organized opposition to the 
American occupation. The same soldier wrote that the Mexican 
government's endorsement of guerilla warfare merely gave "authority to 
every score of ruffians" in the country to go about "robbing and 
murdering indiscriminately."201 Other soldiers shared this sentiment. The 
term guerilla was frequently used interchangeably with the words robbers, 
rabble, and rancheros.202 
Fitting with this role as ruthless bandits, guerillas apparently had few 
scruples about targeting their own countrymen. Soldiers often portrayed 
Mexican civilians as fearful of guerilla raids.203 Aside from "robbing and 
communications through guerrilla warfare. Chamberlain 218. "A train is very difficult to 
protect at all points from the attacks of guerillas." Collins 68. 
200Donnavan 116. 
201
 Donnavan 116,25. 
202
 Outlaws certainly remained active in Mexico during the occupation, but soldiers 
unreasonably labeled all Mexicans who participated in irregular warfare as bandits. "It 
was robbed by some of the rancheros, or in other words, by some of the old established 
robbers, who now design legalizing their rascality by claiming to belong to the Mexican 
Guerrillas." Artillery 183. "Guerillars [sic] at last!" After a skirmish, Chamberlain listed the 
number of casualties "of the robbers." Chamberlain 220, 222. Zachary Taylor never used 
the word guerilla in his unofficial correspondence, instead calling those who engaged in 
that "description of warfare" "robbers." Taylor 94, 149. "The roads are filled with bands 
of robbers under the name of guerillas." Smith 153. "It is thought that the guerillas and 
rabble are in league together..." Smith 166. "They say the surrounding country is infested 
with robbers and guerilla bands..." Collins 67. "Those atrocious bands called guerillas or 
rancheros... No quarter will be given to known murderers or robbers, whether guerillas or 
rancheros" Scott 574-5. 
203
 "...roaming bands of robbers, as much to be dreaded by the Mexicans as by the 
Americans." Norton 126. "The guerilla priest, Jarauta, ...has long been the terror of all 
peaceable Mexicans within his reach." Scott 567. Friendly people in Baja California 
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murdering their own inhabitants," guerillas were rumored to commit 
horrific deeds with their Mexican victims.204 Private Chamberlain, who 
had accused Texas Rangers of major atrocities, wrote, "The guerillars [sic], 
if possible, were guilty of worse acts than the Rangers, and the conflict 
was no longer war but murder, and a disgrace to any nation calling itself 
Christian."205 
Had the Mexican government intended the guerilla movement to 
form the base of a resistance, their plan apparently backfired. In the way 
that soldiers depicted them, guerillas could find no support among the 
population, and their actions sometimes even pushed Mexicans into the 
arms of the invaders. Continuing the theme of Mexican-American 
conciliation, several officers pointed out how some guerilla parties unified 
Americans and local Mexicans against a common enemy. Mexican 
authorities assisted American troops in stamping out these threats to 
peace and stability, and better appreciated the protection that the 
American occupation provided.206 
were victims of guerillas. Du Pont 36. "The roads are filled with bands of robbers under 
the name of guerillas, who are as ready to plunder and murder the Mexicans as they are 
to attack us." Smith 154. "The inhabitants of Jalapa are in a state of uneasiness and 
alarm. They say the surrounding country is infested with robbers and guerilla bands, and 
that as soon as we remove our protection from the town they will rush in and rob, pillage, 
and murder the inhabitants." Collins 67. 
204
 Norton 111. Chamberlain, who could be counted on to give the most sensational 
account, gave graphic descriptions of guerillas blowing up victims and forcing girls to do 
their bidding. Chamberlain 176. 
205 Chamberlain 177. 
206 -rwo thousand convicts and as many guerillas (soldiers "who had disbanded 
themselves and thrown off their uniforms") in Mexico City were put down thanks to 
American troops and "the exertions of municipal authorities." At Atlixco, a city that 
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Guerilla activity may have been widespread, but so long as it did 
not indicate a potentially dangerous resistance movement, the American 
forces were confident that the occupation could go on unimpeded. One 
officer styled guerilla warfare, "a matter not likely to produce important 
results, except the loss here and there of valuable lives."207 Army 
detachments guarded towns and participated in "Guerillar [sic] hunting" 
to limit the damage that could be done.208 The conventional forces of 
the Mexican army were seen as the major obstacle to the American 
occupation, and once they had disbanded, some accounts suggested, 
the careful soldier had nothing to fear from unorthodox fighters like 
guerillas.209 
Again, soldiers portrayed an aspect of the occupation in a 
suspiciously convenient manner. Although Mexico was well known for its 
banditry, it is difficult to believe that, given the broad scope of the guerilla 
movement, all guerillas were petty robbers. Sources from the guerillas' 
perspective are lacking, but the Mexican government's call to resist must 
formerly supported guerilla activity, "so much terror has been impressed upon them [the 
citizens]... that I am inclined to believe they will give us no more trouble." General Scott 
and His Staff 67, 135. "This is a fine state of things truly, when these people must call on a 
foreign invading army to protect them against their own country-men." Collins 67. 
207
 Du Pont 223. 
208 Guerillas visited Puebla daily incognito, but because "our guards are so strong and our 
troops so well posted that they will not attempt to commit any depredations on our 
property or persons." Anderson 224. "Guerillar [sic] hunting" had become a phrase for 
finding and routing guerilla parties. Chamberlain 221. 
209
 Captain Anderson was not afraid of the march because "I have not the least idea of 
seeing a soldier enemy between this and Puebla." Anderson 160. "There is no danger... 
I do not believe there will be any more fighting except with small parties; from what I can 
learn from well informed Mexicans, their army has pretty much disbanded" Taylor 146. 
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have been compelling motivation for the patriotic and the faithful. 
Americans, however, found that the stereotype of Mexican lawlessness 
rang true to their understanding of the country, and were quick to point to 
guerillas' offenses against fellow countrymen as proof that these were 
bands of criminals, not freedom fighters. Rabble, in turn, was something 
that could be dealt with, reinforcing the confident depiction of the 
occupation. 
American Superiority 
The potential obstacles to occupying Mexico outlined above were 
portrayed by soldiers as nonexistent, unimportant, or surmountable. But if 
unforeseeable problems should present themselves, a sense of general 
American superiority encouraged faith in the United States' ability to 
overcome. Some conveyed their confidence through expressions of 
racial and cultural superiority over the Mexicans, while others highlighted 
American gallantry and ingenuity. These convictions combined to leave 
the reader feeling optimistic about the success of any American venture 
in Mexico. 
During the war, Mexico played the role of a foil to the United States 
in Americans' soldiers accounts.210 Thus when these authors constructed 
their depictions of the Mexican people, they shed light on what they 
2,0
 "The people of the two nations differ as widely as the poles, in their habits, pursuits, 
and conceptions of what constitutes refinement." Donnavan 53. 
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thought Americans were by showing what Mexicans were not. Specific 
language was used to highlight what traits were absent: Mexicans were 
"not patriotic... nor generous and manly."211 Neither were they "an 
industrious and enterprising population, such as is generally found in the 
towns of the United States."212 What positive and productive qualities 
Mexicans lacked, Americans had. Some went so far as to deem it 
unnatural that the unworthy Mexicans inhabited the land as a race, and 
American superiority was most vigorously asserted by those who 
recommended Mexico's domination.213 What obstacles could possibly 
hinder the American occupation when annexation was as unavoidable 
as "destiny?"21* 
Expressing cultural superiority was less sensational than declaring 
racial superiority, but it subtly achieved the same goal. The scenes of 
"utter Mexican wretchedness" that soldiers depicted would never be 
found in the civilized world of the United States.215 But rather than 
2" Collins 67. 
2'2Donnavan 15. 
213
 For a stable government to become established in Mexico, "the country must be 
inhabited by a different race of people." Tennery 37. "At some future day, when a 
civilized and enlightened people shall succeed the present 
Population..." When implies inevitability. Donnavan31. "What a wrong and unnatural 
thing it is that this beautiful country should be possessed by such a worthless, idle, vicious, 
mongrel race." Collins 68. "If she makes the game last much longer, we will not have 
the Rio Grande for a boundary but the chain of mountains called Sierra del Madre." VV/7/ 
is a very strong word, emphasizing American capability. Dana 85. 
214
 "I say, hold on to this country. It is its destiny. It is ours. We are compelled to this policy 
we cannot avoid it." Major General Quitman, 15 October 1847, General Scott and His 
Staff 103. 
215
 At the town of Perote, "The men haunted the silent and ruinous streets with their 
melancholy visages, and wrapped in their dingy blankets, looking like spectres of famine; 
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portraying Mexican indolence, ignorance, and misery as something 
racially inherent, these soldiers attributed them to the oppressive Mexican 
government and the Catholic Church.216 The American occupation was 
construed by some as a philanthropic opportunity for a civilized people to 
establish a responsible government in the backward nation.2'7 Although 
they used less belligerent rhetoric, their message of American superiority 
over the Mexicans was the same. 
The term superiority implies something relative, but discussions of 
American greatness on the battlefield needed no comparison. The 
successful campaign against the large, proud Mexican army was no small 
feat of American arms, noted several soldiers.218 Components of 
no employment, or any appearance of it, nothing but dirt, indolence, hunger, and utter 
Mexican wretchedness, in the midst of scenes of smiling plenty." Autobiography of an 
English Soldier 224. At a scene of worship, "crowds of lepers in gaudy and ragged scraps 
with matted hair and naked limbs; wretches in the foulest rags; mendicants and humble, 
half naked Indians kneel and creep on the floor." Preston 37. 
216
 "Under the present system of religious intolerance which prevails in Mexico, it cannot 
be expected that the country will become progressive or prosperous." Autobiography of 
an English Soldier 233. "Education would make them good citizens. Ignorance keeps 
them serfs." Anderson 181. "Her people [Baja Californians] have struggled against this 
neglect and misrule, and are very poor." Du Pont 12. "The millions are... abject to the 
priests and trampled to the dust by the wealthy." Smith 154. 
2,7
 "The home question then bears upon the soul - are we to be kept here as guardians of 
a people who acknowledge themselves incompetent of self-government?" Anderson 
331-2. "If anything can reconcile one to the injustice of carrying the war into the interior 
of Mexico, it would be the benefit that might possibly result, by showing the Mexicans the 
grievous inferiority of vigorous action which the deadening influence of this system has 
produced." Autobiography of an English Soldier 233. 
218
 "They [Mexicans] can scarcely realize their misfortune and cannot account for the 
best army which ever left Mexico being thus cut up by a handful of men..." Dana 69. 
"Here was a spectacle heretofore unheard of: A mere handful of men, entering with 
hostile intentions a nation of the magnitude of the Mexican Republic; they, a nation 
trained to arms from their infancy, boasting of their military prowess and achievements in 
bygone days; we, leaving a Congress behind us debating whether they would furnish us 
the means of subsistence or whether we should be left to our fate, and some of that 
Congress wishing that we might be ' welcomed by bloody hands to inhospitable graves;' 
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American gallantry were scattered through many soldiers' battlefield 
accounts, but they could all be found in Private Chamberlain's classic 
story of the battle of Buena Vista. Outnumbered by uncharacteristically 
capable Mexican foes, American forces initially endured an enormous 
onslaught. The tension was palpable as the Americans almost 
succumbed, but at the last moment they heroically rallied and carried the 
day.2'9 Chamberlain's story characteristically read as if it were made for 
the silver screen, but even battlefield reports contained the rhetoric of 
heroism.220 Every clash generated more stories of American gallantry of 
which people became "surfeited in these days of heroics."221 Indeed, 
not-so-friendly rivalries began between regiments who fought over which 
had been the most gallant, according to one officer; "Such is glory!"222 
Such faith in American battlefield proficiency inspired great 
confidence despite the odds. Independent of their criticisms of Mexican 
army, some American troops displayed absolute conviction in their ability 
yet we pushed on, with a force never exceeding eleven or twelve thousand men, first 
capturing their metropolis, then penetrating to the heart of their country." Norton 165. 
219 Chamberlain 119-128. 
220
 Reports engaged in the rhetoric of heroics ranging from briefly to elaborately. 
According to one concise report, orders were "finely executed by this gallant army" 
Scott 436. General Quitman reported much more floridly, "How this gallant army of nine 
thousand men descended into this valley, broke through a line of almost impregnable 
batteries in four battles defeated an enemy of thirty-five thousand, took more than one 
hundred guns, and four thousand prisoners, and erected the glorious stars and stripes' on 
this palace, where, since the conquest of Cortez, no stranger banner had ever waved." 
General Scott and His Staff 103. 
221
 General Scott and His Staff 103. 
222
 Smith 213. 
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to overcome this most conventional threat to the occupation.223 Guerilla 
parties and volunteer misconduct were also being dealt with, and twice, 
soldiers specifically mentioned that "Yankee ingenuity" helped surmount 
other major obstacles.224 General Scott praised the merits of "this glorious 
army, which has now overcome all difficulties - distance, climate, ground, 
fortifications, numbers."225 So successful were the Americans than some 
soldiers even suspected divine intervention.226 The American army 
seemed virtually impervious to all obstacles, including those presented by 
the occupation. An officer summed up the situation in that context, "It 
appears that old Polk is really determined on swallowing Mexico without 
any grease [diplomacy]. If he gives us the means, we are just the boys to 
do it."227 
Disease 
Any illusion of American invincibility was betrayed by the disease 
that ravaged troops in Mexico. Sickness was the one exception to what 
was commonly portrayed otherwise as a totally practicable occupation. 
223 "We... feel confident of beating any Army Mexico can bring against us." Anderson 
185. "No firing, men! If twenty dragoons can' t whip a hundred greasers with the saber, I'll 
join the Doughboys, and carry a fence rail all my life." Chamberlain 63. 
224 Collins 79, Norton 167. 
225
 Scott 496. 
226
 "So constantly has victory perched on our banners under every disadvantage and 
with every odds against us, that we may well hope and believe that God is fighting our 
battles with us, or rather for us." Anderson 310. At Fort Brown, "a kind Providence 
protected us." Dana 67. 
227
 Dana 102. 
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A number of soldiers simply could not ignore its devastating effects, 
leaving in their accounts sobering descriptions of scope of illness. Yet 
some nevertheless tried to convey a positive spin by showing scattered 
skepticism of disease's ubiquity and insuperability. 
Soldiers proudly reported that American forces had overcome the 
enemy army, occupied large tracts of Mexico, and won the respect of 
the populace, but many also grudgingly accepted that Americans had 
not triumphed over illness. The heavy toll disease had exacted was 
apparent in the dwindling number of men fit for duty.228 Hospitals were 
grimly depicted as filled beyond capacity with the sick.229 In the face of 
such a powerful menace, soldiers' confidence faltered; one enlisted man 
suspected that the rampant illness was the work of the devil himself.230 
228
 "A great deal of sickness prevailing among the troops." Autobiography of an English 
Soldier 167. "The dress parade was a mere skeleton. Not more than 1/3 of the Regiment 
was out. - Camp looks like a hospital so many pale and sickly faces." Curtis 34. "As an 
evidence of its unhealthiness, he stated that his battalion had been mustered into service 
on the 28th of October, 1847, four hundred nineteen strong; that in six months he had lost 
about two hundred men by death; that at that time he had but forty-two men for duty, 
the rest being in the hospital, or languishing from disease; and that from a single 
company, which at the time he had left the United States was ninety-seven strong, he 
had lost by death one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals and fifty-
three men." Preston 22. "The numbers, among the volunteers, afflicted with the measles 
and mumps, in this vicinity, continue to be very great, and the erysipelas is common 
among all the corps." Scott 571. 
229
 "The sick list and the hospitals were full to overcrowding." Autobiography of an English 
Soldier 233. Even when forces were stationed in town, "large and spacious" hospitals 
were "crowded with sick." There were not enough beds or mattresses, so many had to 
lay on the brick floor. Tennery 28. Volunteers crowded hospitals and "die like sheep." 
McClellan 20. General Taylor wrote to a doctor, "While this war lasts you may always 
calculate on having an overflowing hospital, made up from the sick going & returning to 
& from Mexico." Taylor 117. 
230
 "The king of terrors still reigns without a rival." Tennery 33. 
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When illness so "severely shook the hardiest" soldiers, what could "those 
whose constitutions were of merely human organization" possibly do?231 
There was no concerted effort to portray disease as anything less 
than devastating, but occasionally soldiers downplayed its severity. One 
way to do so was to treat illness as matter-of-fact wastage. In the brutally 
statistical field of logistics, death by disease became just one more factor 
in military strategists' calculations. One soldier was horrified by how one 
detached official could calmly accept an estimated ten percent 
casualties when, in human terms, it meant "decimating twenty-five 
thousand (25,000) brave fellows."232 Others insisted that disease was not 
ubiquitous. Some regulars, quick to criticize their unprofessional 
comrades, suggested that volunteers were particularly susceptible or apt 
to claim sickness to avoid their duties.233 Others suggested that certain 
maladies were linked to particular times, regions and environments.234 It 
231
 Autobiography of an English Soldier 205. 
232
 Preston 40. 
233
 Volunteers did not know proper hygiene, and almost every volunteer regiment 
reported one third to one half their number sick. McClellan 19. A great deal of sickness 
and mortality immediately ensued among the volunteers. Autobiography of an English 
Soldier 205. Numerous new recruits, "after an arduous tour of duty, will be found on the 
sick report for some days." Anderson 122. 
234
 "The yellow fever commences in Vera Cruz about the 15th of April, so we have five 
weeks for operations before a necessity will exist for our moving into the interior." 
Anderson 71. Countryside water was the culprit. Anderson 154. "This [the state of 
Tamaulipas] has the reputation of being the most sickly place in the world. Yellow fever 
and black vomito sweep off its hundreds yearly. The place is almost surrounded by 
stagnant pools and lagunas." Norton 81. Sickness could be justified because, "Probably 
the change of air, experienced in our coming down from the mountains so elevated, to 
the lower coast, has a deleterious effect upon their constituitions (sic)." Furber 425. 
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followed that avoiding or removing these could prevent outbreaks.235 
Soldiers who wrote about sickness as a story of burden and sacrifice 
added a positive spin to a dark situation by applying the rhetoric of 
American gallantry.236 Captain Anderson's exercises in rationalization, 
perhaps to reassure his wife that he was in no danger, bordered on 
absurdity. He was so intent on downplaying the ravages of illness that his 
letters ranged from claiming reports were exaggerated to claiming 
Americans were acclimating.237 These responses were not common, nor 
necessarily convincing given the confirmed dreadfulness and scope of 
illness in the ranks. Still, each effort helped to preserve the sense of 
optimism and confidence that otherwise pervaded soldiers' accounts. 
Conclusion 
American soldiers shared a particular view of Mexico and the 
United States that, overall, produced a unified, confident assessment of 
the occupation. Strategically, the cities and mountain passes that they 
235
 Yankee ingenuity was also applied to the disease issue: "A rigid police has been 
organized, which will, if efficiently carried out, remove the exciting causes to disease 
before the most unhealthy part of the season begins, and it is to be sincerely hoped will 
tend to abate the violence of the Black Death vomite which rages here so fearfully." 
Collins 59. 
236
 "That which has no remedy, however, must be borne." Collins 90. An account of a 
youth dying of illness in a hospital had all of the elements of courageous sacrifice and 
patriotic martyrdom. Furber 414. 
237
 "I must put you on your guard about listening to or rather believing the ten thousand 
reports you will hear and see about the health of our troops. I find that letter writers who 
are with us write lies, either through ignorance, inattention, or design. I will inform you if 
there be any unusual degree of sickness in our Army." Anderson 113. "The whole Army 
seems to be acclimating, as the sick lists of all our commands are large-that of 'G ' Co. is 
slowly, I hope permanently, decreasing." Anderson 218-9. 
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often encountered in their marches made the entire country seem like it 
could be held by such natural control points. Once at those points, 
impressive markets and sufficient trade indicated that supply was not an 
issue, and ample amenities meant occupation did not have to feel 
entirely like a tedious duty. These assessments were probably valid, but 
only partially explained the logistical situation in such a way as to make 
the occupation seem practicable. 
The abject poverty many locals lived in affirmed for many soldiers 
the stereotype of the miserable, cowardly, lazy, and uneducated 
Mexican. Others saw it as a result of centuries of oppression, or some 
combination of the two. Both interpretations meant Mexican resistance 
was far-fetched, and their accounts of entering towns reflect that. The 
guerillas who did fight back were not resisters but pesky robbers, whom 
common Mexicans seemed to detest as much as Americans did. 
American soldiers were confident that they accurately understood 
Mexican people and society, causing them to reject interpretations of the 
situation that might make the occupation seem less feasible. 
Soldiers' notions of American virtue also meant that Mexicans had 
no reason to resist. They were better off under the justice and stability that 
the United States provided, despite volunteers' transgressions. American 
gallantry went hand in hand with American virtue, and soldiers became 
convinced they could accomplish almost anything, no matter the odds. 
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This confidence helped erase any further doubt that the United States 
could successfully occupy Mexico. 
The biggest perceived threat to the occupation was ironically the 
smallest: the microbe. On this issue, some soldiers deviated from the 
prevailing theme of optimism. Attempts to downplay the damage 
wrought by illness were less persuasive, weaker points in otherwise strong 
accounts. And so disease takes its place as the one exception to an 
otherwise universally positive appraisal of the occupation. 
Soldiers' optimism in the face of such a large undertaking reflected 
the confidence shared by many Americans. While policies of Manifest 
Destiny remained open to debate, this confident ideology affected the 
dialogue by downplaying doubts that America could expand. Although 
evidence of stereotypes about American superiority and Mexican 
inferiority are abundant and well-documented, identifying them 
specifically in soldiers' accounts is useful to demonstrate how Americans 
arrived at their optimistic conclusions. Being confronted daily with the 
tasks of occupation, soldiers wrote quite elaborately about the 
application of their beliefs. In their stories, more clearly than in 
contemporary media evidence or politicians' papers, one can see the 
mechanics that led Americans from their understanding of Mexico and 
the United States in 1848 to the conclusion that the annexation of Mexico 
was readily possible. 
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FIGURE 4: 
This diagram depicts the major American operations during the Mexican-
American War. 
"1846-1847 - The Mexican War 1846-1847," American Military History, 
United States Army Center of Military History, 1989. Courtesy of the 
University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. 
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This map traces the route taken by General Scott during his advance on 
Mexico City. The "Camino Real," or Royal Road, was the only major 
access route through the mountainous terrain between Vera Cruz and 
Mexico City. It cut through the rugged Sierra Madre Oriental range, 
connecting the cities of Jalapa and Puebla along the way. 
William R. Shepherd, "Campaigns of the Mexican War Inset, Route from 
Vera Cruz to Mexico," Historical Atlas (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1923). Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The 




The value of annexing Mexico was a subject of intense debate in 
the winter of 1847-8, but America's ability to accomplish such a task was 
not. Americans commonly understood the United States to be superior to 
Mexico on multiple levels, and quite capable of projecting its power. 
Consequently, there was little basis on which to dispute the feasibility of 
annexation. 
Despite disagreeing on the practicality and morality of absorbing all 
of Mexico, American politicians on both sides of the argument felt that if 
the United States committed itself to annexation, it could be done. Their 
debates not only failed to challenge the feasibility of all Mexico, but also 
exposed particular beliefs that justified American confidence. 
These perceptions were displayed and elaborated on in 
contemporary periodicals, sources that both reflected and influenced 
society. Mexican society was depicted as corrupt, abject, and easily 
dominated, while America came across as spirited, powerful, and 
pointedly superior. Together, these common beliefs left no doubt that the 
United States could annex its southern neighbor. 
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Demonstrating how firmly set these general perceptions were in 
American society, even American soldiers who participated in the 
occupation held them. Themes of Mexican weakness and American 
strength readily appeared in their writings, even though they faced 
evidence to the contrary. Through this lens there was little doubt that 
Mexico could be dominated for the long term. 
Had Nicholas Trist followed President Polk's orders and returned to 
his country without a peace treaty, the boundaries of the United States 
may well have extended much further south than the Rio Grande. By 
every indication, the all Mexico movement would continue to gather 
momentum as long as peace seemed distant. Yet Trist's successful 
negotiations with the Mexican government brought the movement to a 
sudden halt. The popular will to annex Mexico was born out of 
desperation for a worthy peace, and the opportunity to gain such a 
peace, albeit less ambitious than some had hoped, carried the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo through Washington. 
When the treaty was ratified by the Senate in March 1848, the all 
Mexico issue became a moot point. The United States withdrew its army 
and confirmed Mexicans' right to a sovereign, though drastically smaller, 
nation of their own. However, from a historical perspective, Americans' 
faith in their country's capability to annex Mexico remains significant. 
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First, highlighting the absence of controversy over America's ability 
to dominate Mexico provides a better understanding of the all Mexico 
debate as a whole. It offers a different perspective from historians' 
traditional analyses of the movement's growth and decline, filling a gap in 
the historiography. It also clarifies the boundaries between points of 
controversy and subjects of agreement in a subject that is normally 
treated as strictly divisive. 
Second, identifying the reasons why Americans did not challenge 
the feasibility of all Mexico illustrates important ideas that helped construct 
the ideology of Manifest Destiny. Racism, Anglo-Saxonism, and a general 
confidence in American strength were prevalent in contemporary 
American society. These key components of the cultural concept of 
Manifest Destiny conspired to depict the United States as superior and 
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